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CLOSING THE GAP: SAFEGUARDING
PARTICIPANTS' RIGHTS BY EXPANDING THE
FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF ERISA
JAYNE ELIZABETH ZANGLEIN*
I. BETRAYAL WITHOUT REMEDY
Insurance companies have little incentive under current state or federal
law to pay, in good faith, disputed medical or pension benefit claims under
plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA).' Current law also does not sufficiently deter employers and plan
administrators from misrepresenting current or future benefits under an
ERISA-governed plan. Because ERISA preempts all state laws that "relate
to" an employee benefit plan,' participants' may not sue an insurer under
state law for improperly denying a claim.4 Neither can a participant sue
an employer or plan administrator under state law for misrepresentation.'
Also preempted is the participant's right to bring a state law claim based
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.M.Ed., Berklee College of Music
1975; J.D. State University of New York at Buffalo 1980.
Research for this Article was conducted by Mark Girtz, J.D., Class of '93 and Randy Fickel, J.D.
candidate 1994. Special thanks to Randy Fickel who discussed, at length, the concepts and theories
developed in this Article and helped edit it. The Article was inspired by a working paper written by
the ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law, Employee Benefits Committee Task Force on
Equitable Estoppel. Members of the Task Force include Stephen R. Bruce, James T. Langford, David
Levin, John M. Maciejczyck, William T. Payne, Howard Shapiro and Dianne Stanton. Their research,
advice, and assistance is gratefully acknowledged. Also, special thanks to Robert N. Eccles and David
E. Gordon who authored the Betrayal Without Remedy series in the ERISA Litigation Reporter, and
Stephen R. Bruce, who wrote a chapter on estoppel in his book, STEVEN R. BRUCE, PENSION
CLAIMS-RGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS (1993).
I. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988); See District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 113
S. Ct. 580 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-47 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
ERISA's definition of an "employee benefit plan," contained in § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3), includes
pension and welfare plans.
3. References to "participants" also include "beneficiaries."
4. Pilot Lfe, 481 U.S. at 57.
5. Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1989).
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on breach of contract,6 negligence,7 emotional distress,8 outrageous and
fraudulent denial of coverage,9 unfair insurance practices,"0 tortious
interference," and bad faith. 2 ERISA's preemption clause is "deliber-
ately expansive"" and "conspicuous for its breadth."' As the Seventh
Circuit put it: "Congress has blotted out (almost) all state law on the
subject of pensions, so that a complaint about pensions [or welfare plans]
rests on federal law no matter what label its author attaches."' 5
Preemption of state law claims would be logical if ERISA provided a
remedy sufficient to deter bad faith claims denial and fraudulent misrepre-
sentation. However, ERISA does not offer such a deterrent. A participant
whose claim has been wrongfully denied can bring a suit under ERISA
section 502(a)(1)(B)16 to recover the benefit which is due under the plan,
but section 502(a)(1)(B) does not authorize other legal or equitable relief.
A participant who is the victim of fraudulent misrepresentation can sue for
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA section 409(a) to restore losses to
the plan, but any benefits recovered are paid to the plan, not to the
participant who sued. 7 In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
6. Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'1 Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
694 (1994); Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA, 944 F.2d 1272, 1275 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed,
113 S. Ct. 2 (1992); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419,421-22 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); Shaw v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
Pension Plan, 563 F. Supp. 653, 658-59 (C.D. Cal. 1983), af'd 750 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1137 (1985).
7. Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697 (1st Cir. 1994) (preempting state claim of negligent
misrepresentation); Greany v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812, 818-20 (9th Cir.
1992); Cromwell, 944 F.2d at 1275; Ramirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760, 762-63 (5th Cir.
1989).
8. Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 303-04; Powell, 780 F.2d at 421-22.
9. Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 715 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (D. Kan. 1989), oJfd, 927 F.2d 505
(10th Cir. 1991).
10. Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 906 (1989).
11. Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302-03.
12. Tomcyzk v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 715 F. Supp. 914, 917 (E.D. Wis. 1989), aff d,
951 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2274 (1992); Davidian v. Southern Calif. Meat
Cutters Union & Food Employees Ben. Fund, 859 F.2d 134, 135 (9th Cir. 1988).
13. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987).
14. FMC v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990).
15. Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1992).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988). This section allows a participant or beneficiary to sue "to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of the plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the
plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." Id.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1988). ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1988) authorizes
a participant or beneficiary to sue for "appropriate relief' under § 409. Recovery under § 409(a) inures
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Russell," the Supreme Court dealt a double blow to participants: the
Court denied recovery of extra-contractual compensatory and punitive
damages under ERISA section 409(a)19 and held that recovery under
section 409 is limited to the plan, and does not authorize recovery to
individual participants.2" This ruling has made lower courts reluctant to
award these damages2 ' under section 502(a)(2) and (3).' More recently,
in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,23 the Supreme Court dealt the penultimate
blow and held that ERISA section 502(a)(3) does not permit recovery of
to the benefit of plan, not the participant. See discussion infra at notes 18-20.
18. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
19. Id. at 144. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan interpreted the majority opinion as leaving
open the question "whether and to what extent extracontractual damages are available under
§ 502(a)(3)." Id. at 150 (Brennan, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 144.
21. See Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 824-25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 909 (1988); Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1011 (2d Cir. 1993); Pane v. RCA Corp., 868
F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1989); U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. District 17, 897 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 1990);
Reinking v. Philadelphia Am. Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 1210, 1219 (4th Cir. 1990); Powell v. Chesapeake
& Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); Sommers
Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456, 1462-64 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034, 479 U.S. 1089 (1987); Medina v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 983 F.2d
29, 32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 66 (1993); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d
1321, 1334-35 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 817 (6th
Cir. 1987); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 660 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992);
Kleinhans v. Lisle Say. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1987); Kuhl v. Lincoln
Nat'l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 694 (1994); Sokol
v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1986); Alexander v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 990 F.2d 536, 539-
40 (10th Cir. 1993); LaFoy v. HMO Colorado, 988 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1993); McRae v. Seafarers'
Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819 (11 th Cir. 1991); United Steelworkers v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499,
1508-10 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989); Amos v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 868
F.2d 430, 431 n.2 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 855 (1989).
In Mertens v Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993), Justice White, in a dissenting opinion, noted
that courts are split on whether punitive damages may be recovered under ERISA § 502(a)(2). Mertens,
113 S. Ct. at 2076, 2077 n.6 (White, J., dissenting). Compare Kuntz v. Reese, 760 F.2d 926, 938 (9th
Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 785 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 916 (1986)
(allowing punitive damages) with Sommers Drug Stores, 793 F.2d at 1463 (disallowing punitive
damages). See also Cox v. Eichler, 765 F. Supp. 601, 610-11 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (finding punitive
damages available under § 502(a)(2) but not under § 502(a)(3)). In Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 n.12 (1985), the Supreme Court reserved judgment on whether punitive
damages are recoverable by a plan from a fiduciary under § 502(a)(2).
22. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988), authorizes civil suits by participants and
beneficiaries:
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii)
to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan.
23. 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
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money damages.24 It remains to be seen how the final blow will be
dealt-the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the availability of punitive
damages under section 502(a)(2).
Despite ERISA's stated goal of safeguarding the rights of plan partici-
pants' and "providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the Federal courts,"26 the participant whose claim has been
wrongfully, or even fraudulently denied, is left without a remedy. A
participant who has been the victim of fraudulent misrepresentation with
respect to plan benefits has no remedy. The participant is caught in the
vortex of an ever-expanding preemptive black hole,27 unregulated by
ERISA, and unprotected by state law.
The plight of these remediless participants has not gone unnoticed. In
1991, Senator Howard Metzenbaum and Representative Howard Berman
introduced legislation that would allow participants to recover extra-
contractual damages from insurance companies which wrongfully deny
benefits under ERISA plans.28 During congressional hearings, participants
24. Id.
25. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1988).
26. Id. § 1001(b). See also H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655 (noting that "intent of the Committee is to provide the full range of legal and
equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts.").
27. See United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp.,
995 F.2d 1179, 1197 (3d Cir.) ("Since no law exists in a vacuum and arguably many laws could be held
to 'relate to' ERISA plans, without some limits Section 514(a) [ERISA's preemption clause] could
become a legal blackhole with an attractive force no state law could resist."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
382 (1993).
28. S. 794, 102d Cong. Ist Sess. (1991); H.R. 1602, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Both versions
of the bill would have amended ERISA to provide that:
nothing in this title shall be construed to relieve or exempt any insurance company or other
insurer from any provision of the statutory or common law of any state to the extent that such
provision provides a remedy against insurance companies or other insurers who, in the
administration of an employee benefit plan or in the processing of insurance claims
thereunder, engage in unfair insurance claims practices in connection with such claims, except
that nothing in this clause shall be construed to relate to remedies against plan sponsors.
In the 103rd Congress, Representative Berman took a different approach. He sponsored the Health
Insurance Claims Fairness Act of 1993. H.R. 1881, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The Act would
establish a claims resolution board which would administer an early resolution program for claims under
employee welfare benefit plans. Welfare claims disputes would be submitted to the early resolution
program for resolution through mediation. The Act would lift ERISA's preemption clause with respect
to any state law that "provides sanctions against insurance contractors for unfair claims settlement
practices." H.R. 1881, § 6(a).
Representative Berman's bill has been dwarfed by the health care reform legislation pending in
Congress. Most of the major health care reform bills have grievance or mediation provisions which
may protect participants and beneficiaries. Undoubtedly, these provisions will change as the legislative
proposals develop.
[VOL. 72:671
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss2/5
SAFEGUARDING PARTICIPANTS' RIGHTS
and beneficiaries testified on abuses by insurers.29 A mother testified on
behalf of her son, a plan beneficiary:
This is my son Devon. He is 5 years old and has been afflicted since birth
with Spinal Muscular Atrophy ... a progressive, degenerative neurological
disease ....
I had always had difficulty convincing Allstate to pay for necessary
equipment .... However, the existence of insurance never seemed to be in
doubt and we always felt we were covered and in "good hands"....
In 1989, we were informed that Allstate was terminating the group's policy
and with it Devon's only hope of continuing to receive vital medical care.
A one year extension of benefits was provided under the policy, but after one
year, Devon would be dropped by the "good hands" people. Allstate didn't
care that Devon would die without insurance, let alone that it was against
California law to deny coverage for Devon's condition ....
I was told in no uncertain terms that Allstate's actions were motivated by
money alone and "Allstate would be better off if Devon died."
Currently, under ERISA, there is no incentive for Allstate or other carriers
to act properly, legally and morally. Too many of them have the same
attitude as was expressed to me by Allstate's representatives. Why pay
claims in a timely fashion or at all, when at worst that failure or delay will
result in merely having to pay what the policy offered to begin with?3"
Once hailed as ERISA's "crowning achievement,"3  the preemption
clause has been demoted to a "veritable Sargasso Sea of obfuscation."3
2
The preemption clause has become a convenient defense for unscrupulous
insurance companies and employers. In the words of Judge Birch of the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit: "An employer in this circuit can
now hoodwink a long time employee and leave him stranded without any
29. The ERISA Preemption Amendments of 1991: Hearings on S. 794 Before the Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1991) (statement of Cindy
and Devon Ferguson).
30. Id. These complaints were echoed by plaintiffs' attorney:
The law of bad faith breach of contract was created by state courts as a remedy where insurance
companies and others unreasonably refuse to pay when required by contract. Without the threat
of large damage claims for bad-faith behavior, many insurance companies would prefer to sit
back and watch the insured attempt to collect. At the worst, the company will have to pay later
what it should have paid earlier. The insured may even be persuaded to settle for less than the
amount specified in the insurance contract. Even better-from the insurance company's
view-the insured may die before a jury gets to hear about his pain and suffering.
William Carr and Robert Liebross, Wrongs Without Rights: The Needfor a Strong Federal Common
Law, ofERISA, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 221, 223-24 (1992/1993).
31. 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent).
32. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 717 (2d Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, 62
U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1994).
1994]
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recourse whatsoever."33  Judge Birch noted "that 'any court forced to
enter the ERISA preemption thicket sets out on a treacherous path."'' 34 He
admonished, "obviously the Supreme Court needs to do some serious
bushhogging in the ERISA preemption thicket."35
Judge Hutchinson of the Third Circuit has, perhaps, best described the
problem:
The feeling of unfairness is palpable. Hopefully, it will not be beyond the
power of the court and Congress to dispel that sense of injustice .... Logic
may be the law's tool but its heart is justice, and the public's demand for
concrete justice will not be contained by the straitjacket of inflexible rules.3 6
Until legislation is enacted to fill in the "regulatory vacuum" created by
ERISA's preemption clause, or until the Supreme Court does its "serious
bushhogging," plan participants must rely on the federal common law of
ERISA to provide remedies. Although courts have recognized and
developed federal common law with respect to ambiguous or conflicting
plan provisions, courts have been reluctant to create federal common law
based on oral representations and unambiguous plan language. This Article
will explore the current boundaries of the federal common law of ERISA
and will urge the expansion of these boundaries to protect plan participants
who have been betrayed without a remedy.3"
33. Sanson v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 623 (11 th Cir. 1992) (Birch, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
34. Id. at 625 (quoting Gonzales v. Prudential Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1990)).
35. Id. It appears that Justice Stevens would agree with this assessment. In a dissenting opinion
in District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 513 (1992), Justice Stevens
criticized the majority's decision that ERISA preempts a workers' compensation law provision that
required employers who provide health insurance for their employees to provide equivalent health
insurance for injured workers eligible for workers' compensation benefits. Justice Stevens stated:
The statute at issue in this case does not regulate even one inch of the preempted field,
and poses no threat whatsoever ofconflicting and inconsistent state regulation. By its holding
today the court enters uncharted territory. Where that holding will ultimately lead, I do not
venture to predict. I am persuaded, however, that the Court has already taken a step that
Congress neither intended nor foresaw.
Id. at 588.
36. Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 1993) (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
37. Daniel Fox & Daniel Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in EPJSA: Legislative Process and Health
Policy, 7 AM. J. TAX PoL'y 47, 48 (1988).
38. See Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989). Degan coined the phrase
"Betrayal Without Remedy" to describe the legal conclusion that ERISA precludes enforcement of oral
modifications and that promissory estoppel is not an available remedy. The court describes this
conclusion as an "unhappy denouement." Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss2/5
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II. CROSSING THE SARGASSO SEA
The goal of preemption was to prevent a patchwork of state laws
regulating employee benefits. 9 By preempting state laws that "relate to"
employee benefit plans, Congress could ensure uniform regulation of
employee benefit plans.4' Because ERISA's preemption clause is so
broad, federal courts are empowered to develop a federal common law of
ERISA.4 But the preemption of state law regulating employee benefit
plans has created a regulatory vacuum which most courts are unwilling to
fill in accordance with Congress' mandate.42
ERISA regulates most, but not all, aspects of employee benefit plans.
For example, ERISA contains detailed reporting and disclosure require-
ments.43 ERISA also provides a comprehensive fiduciary duty section
which regulates the conduct of plan trustees and administrators.'
Although ERISA establishes minimum participation,45 vesting,46 benefit
accrual,47 and funding' standards for pension plans, ERISA does not
39. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987). In Coyne, the Court observed:
ERISA's pre-emption provision was prompted by recognition that employers establishing and
maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of coordinating complex
administrative activities. A patch-work scheme of regulation would introduce considerable
inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with existing
plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them. Pre-
emption ensures that the administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by only
a single set of regulations.
Id.
40. The Fifth Circuit has noted that "[t]his sweeping pre-emption of state law is consistent with
Congress's decision to create a comprehensive, uniform federal scheme for the regulation of employee
benefit plans." Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1329 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 812 (1992). See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1987).
41. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1335. See also Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d
1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1984).
42. Courts have recognized that it makes "little sense to adopt a state law rule, which Congress
has chosen to preempt, as a matter of federal common law." Evans v. Safeco Life Ins. Co. 916 F.2d
1437, 1439 (9th Cir. 1990). See also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 319 (1981) ("The
establishment of... a self-consciously comprehensive program by Congress ... strongly suggests that
there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal common law.")
(referring to the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1988).
44. Id. §§ 1101-1114.
45. Id. § 1052.
46. Id. § 1053.
47. Id. § 1054.
48. Id. §§ 1081-1086.
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contain similar requirements for medical and other welfare plans.49
Congress expected that ERISA would leave some gaps in regulation.50
During congressional hearings, Senator Javits said that "it is also intended
that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to
deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and
pension plans.""1 The Ninth Circuit has recognized the duty of federal
courts to develop a federal common law of ERISA: "Congress realized
that the base, however detailed, of these statutory provisions would not be
sufficient to establish a comprehensive regulatory scheme. It accordingly
empowered the courts to develop, in light of reason and experience, a body
of federal common law governing employee benefit plans."52
Recent legislative history encourages courts to develop federal common
law to provide remedies beyond those specifically listed in ERISA section
502:
The Committee believes that the legislative history of ERISA and subsequent
expansions of ERISA support the view that Congress intended for the courts
to develop a Federal common law with respect to employee benefit plans,
including the development of appropriate remedies, even if they are not
specifically enumerated in section 502 of ERISA.. . . [T]he Committee has,
over the years, considered the option of amending the statute to encompass
49. Id. § 1051(1).
50. Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1470 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 1016
(1987). The court described the "gap" caused by preemption:
The employees protest that to hold that ERISA preempts this fraud claim, while also holding
that ERISA does not prohibit the wrong the employees feel they have suffered, leaves a "gap"
in the law. That is exactly the result that obtains when Congress determines that federal law
should govern a broad area to the exclusion of state regulation and chooses not to prohibit
the actions formerly prohibited by state law. It is the very conflict between the federal
scheme and state law that is to be avoided through preemption. To argue that Congress has
created a "gap" in the law does not undermine the reasoning on which a finding of
preemption is based.
Id. See also Pohl v. National Benefits Consultants, 956 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The fact that
ERISA does not provide a substitute remedy reflects not a senseless gap in the statute but a
determination to carry through the policy we have described by confining participants to the
entitlements spelled out in writing."). But in Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Maryland, 939
F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3014 (1992), the court said: "[C]ongress wanted
courts to fill any gaps in the statute by looking to traditional trust law principles."
51. 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits).
52. Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted). See also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26
(1983); Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1297 (5th Cir. 1989); Degan v. Ford Motor Co.,
869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989); Reid v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 93-2969, 1994 WL
56007 (8th Cir. Feb. 28, 1994) (not yet released for publication); Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956,
959 (11th Cir. 1986).
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specifically several additional remedies. In light of the legislative history on
this issue, however, the Committee believes such action is unnecessary. The
Committee reaffirms the authority of the Federal courts to shape legal and
equitable remedies to fit the facts and circumstances of the cases before them,
even though those remedies may not be specifically mentioned in ERISA
itself. In cases in which, for instance, facts and circumstances show that the
processing of legitimate benefit claims has been unreasonably delayed or
totally disregarded by an insurer, an employer, a plan administrator, or a plan,
the Committee intends the Federal Courts to develop a Federal common law
of remedies, including (but certainly not limited to) the imposition of punitive
damages on the person responsible for the failure to pay claims in a timely
manner.
5 3
Even with this strong legislative history, courts have been slow to
develop a federal common law of ERISA. Some courts have refused to
consider this recent legislative history. 4 Other courts have developed
federal common law relying on "ERISA's broad preemption provision
[which] makes it clear that Congress intended to establish employee benefit
plan regulation as an exclusive federal concern, with federal law to apply
exclusively, even where ERISA itself furnishes no answer."55
If Congress legislates interstitially and leaves state law undisturbed,
federal courts have little authority to fashion rules under federal common
law.56 If, however, Congress expressly sweeps away state law, as it did
when it enacted ERISA, courts have greater authority to fashion common-
law remedies. This will be discussed further in Part III.
A. Accuracy is Not a Lot to Ask: Estoppel If a Summary Conflicts with
the Plan
Employee benefit disputes often arise when a participant relies, to her
detriment, on a provision in a summary plan description (SPD) which
conflicts with the actual plan document. For example, the SPD might place
a cap of $1,500 per year for dental care; this cap might conflict with the
53. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 56 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 1948.
54. MeRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819, 822-23 (11th Cir. 1991). See also Medina
v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir.) ("Had Congress intended to develop ERISA
remedies additional to the ones it specifically crafted, it has had ample opportunity to enact such
legislation. Since Congress has not translated its intent into law, we are loathe to take this initiative
on our own."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 66 (1993).
55. In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1986).
56. PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. Western Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir.
1992).
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plan document which limits dental care to $1,000 per year. If the
participant reads the SPD and relies on it when scheduling dental
appointments, the plan must adhere to the provisions contained in the
SPD. 57
ERISA requires the plan administrator to provide an SPD to participants
and beneficiaries." The SPD must contain certain information about the
plan59 and must "be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehen-
sive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights
and obligations under the plan."" The SPD must describe the plan's
eligibility requirements,6' the plan benefits,62 and any circumstances which
may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial, loss, forfeiture, or
57. If the SPD is not distributed to the plan participant, the plan may be estopped from applying
plan provisions which forfeit benefits. In Hillis v. Waukesha Title Co., 576 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (E.D.
Wis. 1983), the court stated that "where a plan participant is reasonably unaware of a benefit forfeiture
clause, and where the plan administrator fails to take any steps to advise the participant of the forfeiture
clause, the forfeiture may not be enforced against the participant." In Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004
(2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit held that failure to provide participants with an SPD is a breach of
fiduciary duties. Id. at 1011. Similarly, if the plan contains an exclusion, but the summary does not,
the benefit plan may be estopped from applying the exclusion. Zittrouer v. Uarco Inc. Group Ben. Plan,
582 F. Supp. 1471 (N.D. Ga. 1984). See also Genter v. Acme Scale & Supply Co., 776 F.2d 1180 (3d
Cir. 1985).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1988).
59. See id. § 1022(b). ERISA provides that the SPD shall contain, among other information:
The name and type of administration of the plan; the name and address of the person
designated as agent for the service of legal process, if such person is not the administrator,
the name and address of the administrator, names, titles, and addresses of any trustee or
trustees (if they are persons different from the administrator); a description of the relevant
provisions of any applicable collective bargaining agreement; the plan's requirements
respecting eligibility for participation and benefits; a description of the provisions providing
for nonforfeitable pension benefits; circumstances which may result in disqualification,
ineligibility, or denial or loss of benefits; the source of financing of the plan and the identity
of any organization through which benefits are provided; the date of the end of the plan year
and whether the records of the plan are kept on a calendar, policy, or fiscal year basis; the
procedures to be followed in presenting claims for benefits under the plan and the remedies
available under the plan for the redress of claims which are denied in whole or part (including
procedures required under section 503 of this Act).
See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3 (1992) for further detail.
60. 29 U.S.C. § I022(a)(1) (1988). The SPD must be clear: It "does no good unless an employee
can read and digest it." Stahl v. Tony's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 875 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1989).
Although "[t]he regulations specify a large number of topics that a plan summary description must
cover,.. [they] say little about what it must explain in discussing each topic.... These regulations
reflect the reasonable interpretation that descriptions must describe all aspects of a plan, but must
remain concise so that employees will read them." Id.
61. 29 C.F.t. § 2520.102-3G) (1992).
62. Id. § 2520.102-36)(l)-(2).
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suspension of benefits.63 The SPD is the "key document in disputes over
benefits entitlement."' If a conflict exists between the SPD and the plan,
courts will estop the plan from enforcing the plan provision and will allow
the SPD to "effectively become the terms of the plan."6
In Heidgerd v. Olin Corp., the Second Circuit held that the SPD is the
"employee's primary source of information regarding employee benefits,
and employees are entitled to rely on the descriptions contained in the
su nary."66 If the plan and SPD conflict, the SPD must control; any
other conclusion "would defeat the purpose of providing the employees
with summaries." 67 As the Eleventh Circuit has noted: "It is of no effect
to publish and distribute a plan summary booklet designed to simplify and
explain a voluminous and complicated document, and then proclaim that
any inconsistencies will be governed by the plan. Unfairness will flow to
the employee for reasonably relying on the summary booklet."68
63. Id. § 2520.102-3(b.
64. Edward B. Miller & Marc A. Dorenfeld, ERISA: Adequate Summary Plan Descriptions, 14
Hous. L. REv. 835, 835 (1977).
65. Id. at 848. See also STEPHEN BRUCE, PENSION CLAIMS: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 390
(1988).
In Flacche v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 958 F.2d 730, 736 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit
stated:
Given the SPD's important role under the ERISA framework, it is natural for courts to
hold the SPD controlling when it conflicts with the plan itself. ERISA embraces a pragmatic
approach: employees are unable to comprehend the technical terms of the plan itself, so the
courts have found the SPD, which must be written comprehensibly, to be controlling. The
comprehensible terms of the SPD take precedence over the incomprehensible, technical terms
of the plan itself. This approach creates a strong incentive to write the SPD carefully, and
it gives beneficiaries an understandable document upon which they can rely.
Id.
In Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050, 1051 (7th Cir. 1991), the Seventh
Circuit stated that ERISA's requirement that the plan administrator provide an SPD to plan participants
and beneficiaries "entitles the participant to rely on the summary plan document, and if he does the plan
is estopped to deny coverage. But only if there is a contradiction between the summary plan document
and the policy."
66. Heidgerd v. Olin Corp., 906 F.2d 903, 907 (2d Cir. 1990). See also Pierce v. Security Trust
Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 23, 27 (4th Cir. 1992).
67. Heidgerd, 906 F.2d. at 908. In Fuller v. FMC Corp., 4 F.3d 255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1062 (1994), the Fourth Circuit held that:
While we agree with the district court that the SPD could have made the termination
benefit crystal clear by using the same language as that used in the plan itself, if that were
the legal requirement, then the purpose of the summary would be frustrated-an SPD required
to use the same words as a plan would be nothing different than the plan itself.
Id. at 261.
68. McKnight v. Southern Life & Health Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1566, 1570 (1 lth Cir. 1985). An SPD
must, by necessity, be a summary: "Larding the summary with minutiae would defeat that document's
function: to provide a capsule guide in simple language for employees." Herrmann v. Cencom Cable
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More recently, in Aiken v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,69 the
Fourth Circuit held that "representations in [an] SPD control over inconsis-
tent provisions in an official plan document."7 The Court quoted Fuller
v. CBT Corp.,7' in which the Seventh Circuit plainly stated: "In the event
of a conflict between the handbook and plan, the former may
trump---clearly so, when it is the employee relying on the handbook, for it
is hardly realistic to expect him to read further."'72
In Hansen v. Continental Insurance Co.,73 the Fifth Circuit held that if
a conflict exists between an ambiguous provision in an SPD, and
unambiguous language in a plan, "the ambiguity in the summary plan
description must be resolved in favor of the employee and made binding
on the drafter."'74 The court stated that the "burden of uncertainty created
by careless or inaccurate drafting" must be borne by the drafter of the plan,
who is better able to bear the burden than the employee who is "ill
equipped to bear the financial hardship that might result from a misleading
or confusing document."'75 The court emphasized: "Accuracy is not a lot
to ask. And it is especially not a lot to ask in return for the protection
afforded by ERISA's preemption of state law causes of action-causes of
action which threaten considerably greater liability than that allowed by
ERISA. ' 6
If a participant relies on an SPD, knowing that it is inaccurate, 7 most
Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 984 (7th Cir. 1992).
The SPD is not required to cover every contingency: "The description, instead, should provide
information about the general circumstances in which benefits could be lost .... It need not discuss
every imaginable situation in which such events or actions might occur, but it must be specific enough
to enable the ordinary employee to sense when there is a danger that benefits could be lost or
diminished." Stahl v. Tony's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 875 F.2d 1404, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989).
69. 13 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1993).
70. Id. at 140.
71. 905 F.2d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 1990).
72. Id.
73. 940 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1991).
74. Id. at 982.
75. Id. The Court noted that if the rule favored the plan over the SPD, then "before a participant
in the plan could make any use of the summary, she would have to compare the summary to the policy
to make sure that the summary was unambiguous, accurate, and not in conflict with the policy. Of
course, if a participant has to read and understand the policy in order to make use of the summary, then
the summary is of no use at all." Id. at 981-82. See also Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d
980, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1048 (1993).
76. Hansen, 940 F.2d at 982.
77. Flacche v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 958 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1992) is a case in which
the participant would seem to have known the SPP was inaccurate. Before retirement Flacche was
advised that he would receive benefits of $2,861 per month. Instead, after getting a bonus of $471, he
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courts refuse to apply estoppel principles.7 s In Branch v. G. Bernd
Co.," the Eleventh Circuit held that a participant must show reliance in
order to recover based on an SPD that conflicts with the plan document.
The court noted that "[t]he First and Third Circuits have expressly held that
a beneficiary who seeks to prevent an insurer from enforcing terms in its
plan that are inconsistent with those of the plan summary must show
reliance on the summary."8 Although the Eleventh Circuit had not yet
expressly held that a participant must prove reliance on the misleading SPD
to recover, in a prior decision the court had stressed the importance of
reliance in cases interpreting conflicting provisions."' The court noted that
"when a beneficiary fails to read or rely on the summary, whether it is
accurate or not, the beneficiary also prevents full appraisal of the rights
under the plan. Beneficiaries must do their part if Congress's objective is
received $4,846. Surely Flacehe should have wondered about the differential of nearly $2,000. After
making overpayments of $30,000, the plan reduced Flacche's benefits to correct the error. Flacche
sued, claiming that he relied on the higher amount when deciding whether to retire. The court held that
"[tihe reduction in benefits about which the Flacches complain was undertaken to correct an ongoing
violation of the plan (overpayment of benefits to Mr. Flacche), not to violate the plan." Id. at 736.
78. The First, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits require reliance. Bachelder v.
Communications Satellite Corp., 837 F.2d 519, 522-23 (1st Cir. 1988); Govoni v. Bricklayers Int'l
Union Local No. 5 Pension Fund, 732 F.2d 250, 252 (Ist Cir. 1984); Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic
Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 1319 n.8 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2856 (1991); Aiken v. Policy
Management Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiff must show reliance or
prejudice); Fuller v. FMC Corp., 4 F.3d 255, 261-62 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1062 (1994);
Pierce v. Security Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 23, 30 (4th Cir. 1992); Maxa, 972 F.2d at 984;
Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 1512, 1520 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1051 (1989); Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit has
defined reliance: "Evidence of detrimental reliance must show that the plaintiff took action, resulting
in some detriment, that [he] would not have taken had [he] known [that the terms of the plans were
otherwise]... or that he failed, to his detriment, to take action that he would have taken had he known
that the terms of the plan were otherwise." Maxa, 972 F.2d at 984 (quoting Monson v. Century Mfg.
Co., 739 F.2d 1293, 1302 (8th Cir. 1984)).
The Second Circuit had considered but has not explicitly required reliance. See Heidgerd v. Olin
Corp., 906 F.2d 903, 907-08 (2d Cir. 1990).
The Sixth Circuit does not require reliance. See Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851
F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1988) (dictum).
The Seventh Circuit has interpreted ERISA's SPD requirement to allow "the participant to rely on
the summary plan document, and if he does the plan is estopped to deny coverage." Senkier v. Hartford
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050, 1051 (7th Cir. 1991). See also Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc.
v. Glover, 975 F.2d 1298, 1305 (7th Cir. 1992).
79. 955 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1992).
80. Id. at 1578.
81. See McKnight v. Southern Life & Health Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1566, 1571 (lth Cir. 1985)
(holding that the participant "was justified in relying on the summary booklet to determine his pension
rights").
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to be met." 2 The court held that the beneficiary must prove reliance on
the SPD before the employer will be estopped from enforcing the terms of
a plan that conflicts with the SPD."3 In this case, the beneficiary did not
meet his burden of proof: he was completely apathetic to the terms of the
plan and no evidence was offered to prove that the beneficiary or the
administrator of his estate even saw the SPD.
As a precaution against inadvertent conflicts between the plan and SPD,
plans often attempt to avoid the binding effect of the SPD by including a
disclaimer. Disclaimers typically state that in the event of a conflict
between the plan and SPD, the plan will control.84 Courts have uniformly
held that such disclaimers are ineffective." In Hansen, the Fifth Circuit
held that "[t]o give effect to. . . a disclaimer would wholly undermine the
rule that statements in the summary plan description are binding. If the
insurer could escape the binding effect of the summary simply by adding
a disclaimer ... the insurer could escape the requirement of an accurate
and comprehensive summary."86
In Zittrouer v. Uarco Inc. Group Benefit Plan,87 the court vehemently
criticized the use of a disclaimer to avoid the plan's disclosure require-
ments:
The fact that defendant's summary plan included the quoted disclaimers
does not relieve the defendant of the statutory requirements of disclosure. To
allow a plan to avoid statutory requirements of disclosure by including
82. Branch, 955 F.2d at 1579.
83. Id.
84. For example, a disclaimer might say:
[T]he purpose of this summary is to describe the Plan to you in nontechnical terms. It is
intended to give you enough information to answer most of the questions you are likely to
have. However, if we covered every detail of the Plan, it would no longer be a summary, but
as technical as the full text itself; so if you have a specific question you should consult the
Plan document.
Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 752 F.2d 1293, 1300 n.13 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1102 (1985). Or, a disclaimer written in legalese might say:
This booklet is not a part of and does not modify or constitute any provisions of the plan
described herein, nor does it alter or affect in any way the rights of any participant under the
plan. The plan and all descriptions and outlines thereof are governed by the formal plan
document. A copy of this plan is on file at the office of the company and may be inspected,
upon request, during the normal business hours of any regular working day.
Trombly v. Marshall, 502 F. Supp. 29 (D.D.C. 1980). Trombly has been vacated by an unpublished
order filed on June 12, 1980.
85. Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971,982 (5th Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Alpha Portland
Indus., Inc., 752 F.2d 1293, 1299 n.13 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1102 (1985).
Contra Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1984).
86. 940 F.2d at 982.
87. 582 F. Supp. 1471 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
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disclaimers of this sort would negate one of ERISA's major goals, protection
of participants and beneficiaries. The court holds that disclaimers of this sort
are invalid in light of ERISA's requirements of disclosure.8
The court emphatically stated that the defendant's failure to include a
description of the circumstances that may result in loss of benefits "is at
best gross negligence and at worst intentional deception through conceal-
ment or inaction." 9
Recently, some courts have recognized that a cause of action exists
against a plan for failure to furnish a sufficiently accurate and comprehen-
sive SPD, as required by ERISA section 102(a)(1).9" In Brumm v. Bert
Bell NFL Retirement Plan,9' the Eighth Circuit held that an SPD "must
not mislead, misinform, or fail to inform participants and beneficiaries of
the requirements of the full plan."' Perhaps more courts will follow the
Eighth Circuit's lead.
B. Interpretation of Ambiguous Plan Provisions
Benefit disputes also arise when a participant, after reading an ambiguous
provision in the SPD, consults with his employer or the plan administrator
for interpretation. After the participant relies to his detriment on the
interpretation of the plan, he seeks to estop the plan from applying an
inconsistent interpretation.
Williams v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.9" illustrates this problem.
Williams was a participant in the Bridgestone/Firestone medical plan. In
1986, he injured his back in a motor vehicle accident and underwent back
surgery.94 Williams returned to work. In April 1988, however, his doctor
advised him that he required further surgery. The surgery might leave him
88. Zittrouer, 582 F. Supp. at 1475.
89. Id.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1988). See Long v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., Fixed Pension Plan for
Pilots, 994 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1993) (dicta) (stating that "any claim relating to the construction of
a pension plan can be transformed into a claim that a summary plan description was insufficiently
accurate or complete"); Brumm v. Bert Bell NFL Retirement Plan, 995 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir. 1993).
91. 995 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir. 1993).
92. Id. at 1439. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(b)(1991) provides: "The format of the summary plan
description must not have the effect to misleading, misinforming or failing to inform participants and
beneficiaries." See Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1048 (1993); Stahl v. Tony's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 875 F.2d 1404, 1406-09 (9th Cir. 1989);
Genter v. Acme Scale & Supply Co., 776 F.2d 1180, 1185 (3d Cir. 1985).
93. 954 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1992).
94. Id. at 1071.
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disabled. 9
The surgery time was flexible: it could have been performed any time
between April and August. Williams discussed the scheduling of his
surgery with his supervisor. His supervisor encouraged him "to schedule
the surgery on April 12, 1988, as this would be during a slack time of
business for the ... store... and it was therefore the best time" from his
employer's perspective.96
At the time of the surgery, Williams had accumulated almost five years
of service with Bridgestone/Firestone and had accumulated three weeks of
vacation.97 This was crucial to Williams as the plan provided that an
employee with less than five years of service who became totally disabled
would continue to receive medical benefits for only two years after the date
of disability. If the employee had accumulated five years of service before
becoming disabled, he would receive medical benefits until his sixty-fifth
birthday.98 Because Williams was just two weeks shy of five years of
service and because he knew the surgery might render him disabled, he
sought additional information on the plan's policy of allowing vacation
time to be added to actual service to determine total years of service for
medical coverage.9 His supervisor told him that "due to his earned and
accrued vacation time, [he] would be considered to have more than five (5)
years of employment service time with Bridgestone/Firestone as of the
surgery date of April 12, 1988.""t Williams relied on this assurance
when scheduling his surgery.' The surgery rendered Williams disabled
and his medical benefits were extended for two years instead of until age
sixty-five as Williams had anticipated. Williams sued.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting
Bridgestone/Firestone's motion for summary judgment and dismissing
Williams' claim. The court recognized Williams' claim for promissory
estoppel and stated that if Bridgestone/Firestone's policy was to calculate
years of service by including unused, accrued vacation time, then Williams
was discriminated against in violation of the terms of the plan. The Fifth
Circuit remanded the case because a genuine issue of material fact existed
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1072.
97. Id.
98. Williams, 954 F.2d at 1072.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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as to Bridgestone/Firestone's policy of calculating years of service."0 2
Courts are careful to distinguish interpretations of ambiguous plan
provisions from oral modifications of unambiguous provisions.0" In
Kane v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., ° the Eleventh Circuit examined a
plan provision that specified when dependents became eligible for medical
benefits under the plan. The plan language was unclear as to when
coverage would begin for an infant who was hospitalized at birth and then
adopted by the plan participant. A plan representative advised Mrs. Kane
that the infant would be covered under the plan when formal legal adoption
proceedings commenced.'0 5 Relying on this interpretation, the parents
adopted the infant and submitted claims for medical services rendered after
adoption. The insurer denied the claims, stating that medical claims
relating to continuous hospitalization are not covered if the hospitalization
began before the effective date of coverage.'" Kane sued.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the representations made by the insurer
to Mrs. Kane were plan interpretations, not modifications.0 7 The court
held that under federal common law, the insurer was estopped from
interpreting the plan provision contrary to its earlier oral interpretation
made to Mrs. Kane.'
In Alday v. Container Corp. of America, the Eleventh Circuit summa-
rized its decision in Kane: "[A] federal common law claim of equitable
estoppel may be applied where (a) the provisions of the plan at issue are
ambiguous such that reasonable persons could disagree as to their meaning
or effect, and (b) representations are made to the employee involving an
102. Judge Duh6 dissented, claiming that the phrase "5 or more years of service" was not
ambiguous. Id. at 1074 (Duh, J., dissenting). He stated:
In my view, the correct result in this case is terribly inequitable. Faced with these difficult
facts, the majority has avoided our precedent [in Rodrique v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 948
F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1991)] and hidden its holding that the phrase "5 years is ambiguous."
Unlike the deconstructionists at the forefront of modem literary [and legal] criticism, the
courts [should] still recognize the possibility of an unambiguous text.
Id. at 1075 (quoting Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Last Days Evangelical Ass'n, 783 F.2d 1234, 1238 (5th Cir.
1986)).
103. Kane v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 893 F.2d 1283 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 890 (1990);
Russo v. Health, Welfare & Pension Fund, Local 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 984 F.2d 762 (7th Cir.
1993). See infra subpart II(C) for a more complete discussion of oral modifications.
104. 893 F.2d 1283 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 890 (1990).
105. Id. at 1284.
106. Id. at 1285.
107. Id. at 1286.
108. Id. See also Simmons v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 940 F.2d 614 (1lth Cir. 1991).
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oral interpretation of the plan."' 9 Both conditions must be met in order
for plaintiffs to prove an equitable estoppel claim based on ambiguous plan
provisions."'
Smith v. Hartford Insurance Group is the Third Circuit's most recent
decision on the interpretation of ambiguous language."' Smith required
continuous skilled nursing care. When her plan converted to a self-insured
plan, she enrolled in the new plan after receiving assurances that the
coverage for nursing home care under the new plan was identical to the old
plan."' The new plan refused to provide coverage and the Smiths sued,
alleging that the employer was estopped to deny its representations."'
The Third Circuit concluded that ERISA section 502(a)(3)" 4 "permits
an ERISA beneficiary to recover benefits under an equitable estoppel
theory, upon establishing a material representation, reasonable and
detrimental reliance upon the representation, and extraordinary circumstanc-
es.
" 115
The court held that the plan language was ambiguous and estopped the
plan from denying its representation that coverage of skilled nursing care
was identical under the two plans. The court emphasized the ambiguous
nature of the contract terms: "[t]hus, our recognition of the Smiths' estoppel
claim is not an effort to 'amend' a plan outside the scope ... of
ERISA."'" 6 The court noted that "[p]rompt and accurate disclosure" of
the plan terms would have prevented the dispute:" 7
Were we to construe these ambiguous terms against the Smiths on summary
judgment absent such disclosure, we would be holding an insured to
constructive knowledge of an insurer's unfavorable post-hoc interpretation of
the insured's rights. Such a result would frustrate accepted principles of
109. 906 F.2d 660, 666 (1 Ith Cir. 1990) (citing Kane v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 893 F.2d 1283, 1286-
87, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 890 (1990)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026 (1991).
110. Simmons v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 940 F.2d 614, 618 (11th Cir. 1991).
111. 6 F.3d 131 (3rd Cir. 1993).
112. Id. at 134. The "old" plan covered skilled nursing care up to a maximum lifetime benefit of
$1 million. The new plan only paid for 180 days of skilled nursing care. Id.
113. The Smiths also alleged that the oral and written representations constituted an employee
welfare benefit plan which would be enforceable under ERISA. The court held that the oral and written
representations did not constitute an informal plan. Id. at 136. See infra notes 190-92 and
accompanying text discussing Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (11 th Cir. 1982).
114. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
115. Smith, 6 F.3dat 137 (citing Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 1319 (3d Cir.
1991)).
116. 6F.3dat 140.
117. Id. at 141.
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insurance contract interpretation"' and the central goals of ERISA." 9
The Ninth Circuit has frequently noted, in dicta, that federal common
law may estop a plan from denying a prior interpretation of ambiguous plan
language. 2 However, participants frequently have not fared well in the
Ninth Circuit.
In Greany v. Western Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co., the Ninth Circuit
expressly held that a plan "can never be equitably estopped where payment
would conflict with the written agreement."'' Estoppel only applies to
ambiguous provisions, not oral modifications. The court stated that
equitable estoppel cannot be applied so as to enlarge a participant's rights
beyond the unambiguous language of the plan.'22 Because the plan was
unambiguous, the court refused to apply equitable estoppel.'23
This result appears particularly harsh in light of the facts. In anticipation
of resigning, Patrick Greany, an insurance salesman, investigated available
insurance options. Through his employer, he applied for coverage with
Western States Life Insurance Company. Coverage was to commence on
September 1, 1983.124 Mr. Greany also requested a quote from his
current insurer, Lincoln National. The form Lincoln National sent to
Greany indicated that his group coverage had terminated on August 1,
1993. Later, an "error" was noticed, and Lincoln National advised Greany
that his coverage would lapse on August 31. On August 26, Mrs. Greany
delivered a premature baby with severe medical problems. On August 29,
Greany notified Lincoln National of the birth of his daughter and a
representative confirmed coverage through August 3 L '
About a week later, Lincoln National realized that the plan had been
amended, effective April 1, 1982, to terminate coverage on the last day of
employment, rather than giving a thirty-one day extension of coverage.126
118. The court cited Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1013 (1990), in which the court adopted the doctrine of contra proferentum in ERISA cases
because insurance policies "are almost always drafted by specialists employed by the insurer." Id. at
540. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
119. Smith, 6 F.3d at 141.
120. See, e.g., Davidian v. Southern Cal. Meat Cutters Union & Food Employees Benefit Fund, 859
F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1988) (dictum); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.
1985) (dictum).
121. Greany, 973 F.2d at 822. See also Davidian, 859 F.2d at 136.
122. Greany, 973 F.2d at 822.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 814.
125. Id. at 815.
126. Id.
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Lincoln National advised Greany that his coverage had terminated on
August 1. Clearly, the plan was unambiguous: the insurer erred in
conveying the correct information to the participant and apparently a copy
of the plan amendment was not provided to Greany.127 Yet, the Court
held that the federal common law of estoppel did not apply because the
plan was unambiguous: "A mistake in referring to an outdated form to
determine eligibility does not rise to the level of an interpretation of the
plan's provisions justifying application of the equitable estoppel doc-
trine."'28  The court did not discuss cases such as Berlin 29 or Ed-
dy, '3 to be discussed later in subpart III(B), which indicate that a plan
administrator has a duty to provide complete and accurate information to
plan participants. Perhaps this argument would have been successful in
Greany.
More recently, a participant's hopes for recovery on an equitable estoppel
theory in the Ninth Circuit have been dashed by the court's decision in
Watkins v. Westinghouse Hanford Co.' The Ninth Circuit reconsidered
the availability of equitable estoppel in ERISA cases, in view of the
Supreme Court's decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates.'32 The issue
in Mertens was whether ERISA section 502(a)(3) "authorizes suits for
money damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a
fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty. 13' The Supreme Court held that the
term 'equitable relief' can also refer to those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution,
but not compensatory damages)."'134 The Supreme Court did not specifi-
cally limit "equitable relief" to injunctions, mandamus, and restitution, but
rather held that money damages are legal, not equitable relief. 35 Yet, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted Mertens as holding "that the term 'other equitable
relief encompasses only the traditional forms of equitable relief, i.e. an
injunction, mandamus, or restitution."'36 The Ninth Circuit held that after
127. Id. at 814.
128. Id. at 822.
129. Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163 (6th Cir. 1988).
130. Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America, 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
131. 12 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit had previously stated the doctrine of
equitable estoppel is applicable in pension cases. Dockray v. Phelps Dodge, 801 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th
Cir. 1986); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1985).
132. 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
133. Id. at 2066.
134. Id. at 2069.
135. Id.
136. 12 F.3d at 1528.
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Mertens, an equitable estoppel claim will survive only if it falls within one
of ERISA's six enumerated civil enforcement provisions.'37 The court
concluded that the participants' claim for equitable estoppel did not fall
within any of the six civil enforcement provisions and denied their claim
for equitable estoppel.
This decision presents a serious obstacle to plan participants. Partici-
pants who sue for equitable estoppel cannot easily fall under any of the six
enumerated provisions. Section 502(a)(1)(B) authorizes a participant to sue
"to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan[.]" 38 Of course, if a participant is suing to
enforce an oral modification, he has no explicit rights under the terms of
the plan since he is seeking to enforce an interpretation of the plan that is
at odds with the terms of the plan. If, however, he is seeking to enforce
an oral interpretation of an ambiguous plan provision, the suit may be
authorized under section 502(a)(1)(B). Section 502(a)(2)139 allows a
participant to sue for breach of fiduciary duty under section 409, a possible
alternate theory to estoppel, but as previously noted, many courts deny
recovery of extra-contractual damages under this section, and the Supreme
Court has not yet ruled on the availability of such damages under this
section. The participant could sue under section 502(a)(3)14 ' "to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief" to redress violations of terms of the plan.
However, the participant faces two obstacles: the terms of the plan do not
authorize recovery if the participant is suing to enforce an oral modification
and monetary damages are unavailable. Section 502(a)(4) 141 is not
helpful as it allows a participant to sue only if the plan has not provided
her with a statement of accrued benefits, and sections 502(a)(5) 142 and
(a)(6) 143 only authorize suits brought by the Secretary of Labor. Section
502(a)(1)(A)'" only authorizes suits for the $100 a day penalty provided
under section 502(c).
A participant could sue under section 502(a)(1)(B) to enforce the terms
of the plan by alleging that because the plan is ambiguous, the court
137. Id.
138. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1988).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4) (1988).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) (1988).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(6) (1988).
144. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A) (1988).
1994]
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should, under the principles of federal common law, construe the ambiguity
in the participant's favor. If confronted with ambiguous plan language,
most courts have applied the insurance rule of contra proferentum or
similar principles of contract interpretation. 4 Under this rule, ambigu-
ities are resolved in favor of the insured.'46 The rule is based on the
contract construction principle "that when one party is responsible for the
drafting of an instrument, ... any ambiguity will be resolved against the
drafter."'14 7  The comparison of ERISA plans to insurance plans is
appropriate:
Insurance policies are almost always drafted by specialists employed by the
insurer. In light of the drafters' expertise and experience, the insurer should
be expected to set forth any limitations on its liability clearly enough for a
common layperson to understand; if it fails to do this, it should not be
allowed to take advantage of the very ambiguities that it could have
prevented with greater diligence .... [A]n insurer's practice of forcing the
insured to guess and hope regarding the scope of coverage requires that any
doubts be resolved in favor of the party who has been placed in such a
predicament.
48
In Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co.,149 the Ninth Circuit
considered whether contra proferentum should be adopted under the federal
common law of ERISA. The court declined to rule directly on the issue
145. Pizzuti v. Polaroid Corp., 985 F.2d 13, 14 (Ist Cir. 1993) (applying ."common-sense canons
of contract interpretation"); Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 936 F.2d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 1991);
Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1258 (3d Cir. 1993); Glocker v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
974 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1992); Ramsey v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 1994);
McNeilly v. Bankers United Life Assurance Co., 999 F.2d 1199, 1201 (7th Cir. 1993); Hickey v. A.E.
Staley Mfg., 995 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1993); Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302,
311-12 (7th Cir. 1992); Delk v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 104, 105-06 (8th Cir. 1992); Kunin v.
Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1013 (1990); Blair v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1992) (resolving ambiguity in the
participant's favor). Contra Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580, 586 (1st
Cir. 1993) (noting that "we generally do not construe ambiguous terms against the drafter'); Maxa v.
John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1048 (1993) (stating
that contra insurer rule is preempted by ERISA); Allen v. Adage, Co., 967 F.2d 695, 701 (1st Cir.
1991); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1985) (declining to apply contra proferentum
in case involving language of a collective bargaining agreement).
146. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 539.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 540. See also Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 314 (7th Cir. 1992)
("Insurers should not be permitted to exploit policy term ambiguities, which they could have avoided,
to deny coverage to an unsuspecting insured.').
149. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 539-40.
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of federal common law,'50 but held that the rule of contra proferentum
applied.' The court noted that "[i]ndeed, it would take a certain degree
of arrogance to controvert an opinion held with such unanimity in [all of]
the various states and to adopt a contrary view as the federal rule." '
Likewise, in Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp.,5 3 the Third Circuit stated:
Adoption of contra proferentum as a federal common law rule in ERISA
insurance cases makes sense because "to do otherwise 'would require us to
... [give] less protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they
enjoyed before ERISA was enacted,' a result that would be at odds with the
congressional purposes" of ERISA.
15 4
C. Disappearing Promises:55 Oral Modifications of Unambiguous
Plan Provisions
1. Interpretation vs. Modification
Courts have distinguished cases involving interpretations of ambiguous
plan documents from oral amendments or modifications of unambiguous
provisions. Although courts will consider extrinsic evidence when
interpreting an ambiguous plan provision, courts will not allow the
modification of unambiguous provisions through consideration of extrinsic
evidence. Typically, courts have held that because ERISA requires a plan
to be put in writing,'56 equitable estoppel is not available to plaintiffs
when oral amendments to or modifications of employee plans governed by
ERISA are involved. 5 7 As a general rule, courts have held that "estoppel
150. The court noted the difficulty with ruling on this issue. Id. at 539-40. Some courts have held
that the rule of contra proferentum is preempted by ERISA. Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.,
867 F.2d 489, 494 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989).
151. 910 F.2d at 540.
152. Id.
153. 2 F.3d 1249 (3d Cir. 1993).
154. Id. at 1257 (quoting Masella, 936 F.2d at 107 and Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113-14).
155. "When benefits are thus reduced or snatched away, the promises those employees thought their
employers had made to them disappear." Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993)
(Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988).
157. Kane v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 893 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
890 (1990). See also Leiding v. FDIC, 940 F.2d 1538 (10th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991), No. 90-5078, 1991
WL 154047 at *2 (unpublished opinion); Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (1lth Cir. 1986).
In National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991), the
Eleventh Circuit explained:
This rule safeguards ERISA's underlying policy of protecting the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans; allowing informal written or oral amendments
to a plan would make it impossible for employees to rely on these plans because their benefits
1994]
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may not be invoked to enlarge or extend coverage specified in a con-
tract."'58
This distinction was made clear in Kane v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.' 9
In Kane, the Eleventh Circuit held that "the federal common law of
equitable estoppel is not available to plaintiffs in cases involving oral
amendments to or modifications of employee benefit plans governed by
ERISA because ERISA specifically addresses these issues." 6 However,
because the court found that the representations made were interpretations,
not modifications, the court held that the plan was estopped from denying
its prior representation. In Novak v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp.,'16' the
Eleventh Circuit again emphasized the difference between modifications
and interpretation. The court explained: "For a representation to be an
interpretation of a plan, the relevant provisions of the plan must be
ambiguous, that is to say, 'reasonable persons could disagree as to [the
provisions'] meaning and effect."" 62  As discussed in the previous
section, if the plan is ambiguous, a court will evaluate extrinsic evidence
to "interpret" rather than "modify" the plan. Interpretations of ambiguous
plan provisions do not violate ERISA's writing requirement 63 or the rule
that "estoppel may not be used to create contractual liability where no
contract originally existed."'"
2. Writing Requirement
One of the most common rationales courts employ when denying oral
modifications of plans is the ERISA requirement that plans be in writing.
ERISA section 402(a)(1) 65 requires employee benefit plans to be "estab-
lished and maintained pursuant to a written instrument." ERISA section
402(b)(3) 166 further requires the plan document to describe the formal
procedures by which the plan can be amended. Because ERISA requires
could be radically affected by funds dispersed to others pursuant to these informal agreements.
Id. at 1571.
158. Kane, 893 F.2d at 1285 n.3.
159. Id. See Russo v. Health, Welfare, & Pension Fund, Local 705, 984 F.2d 762, 767-68 (7th Cir.
1993) (discussing interpretation/modification distinction); Thomason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 F.3d 645,
650 (7th Cir. 1993) (same).
160. Kane, 893 F.2d at 1285. See Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1986).
161. 986 F.2d 468 (11th Cir. 1993).
162. Id. at 472 (quoting Kane, 893 F.2d at 1285).
163. See generally Kane, 893 F.2d at 1285-86.
164. Id. at 1285 n.3.
165. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988).
166. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (1988).
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plans to be in writing, courts have routinely held that oral amendment or
modification of ERISA plans is prohibited. 67 In Coleman v. Nationwide
Life Insurance Co., the court reasoned that if oral modifications of
unambiguous plans were allowed, it would impermissibly "override the
explicit terms of an established ERISA benefit plan."'68  The court
rejected the participant's claim that the insurer's statements interpreted, not
modified, the plan.' 69 The Court refused to apply estoppel principles to
a written plan, noting that courts normally should be reluctant to deviate
from written contractual terms. 7' The court held that the adoption of
167. Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that "an
ERISA welfare plan is not subject to amendment as a result of informal communications between the
employer and plan beneficiaries"); Chambless v. Masters Pension Plan, 772 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1163 (3d
Cir. 1990); Pizlo v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that informal or
unauthorized modification of pension plans is impermissible under ERISA); Audio Fidelity Corp. v.
PBGC, 624 F.2d 513 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding oral testimony inadmissible to vary the unambiguous
terms of an ERISA pension plan); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating
that "ERISA mandates that [a] plan itself and any changes made to it [are] to be in writing"); Gordon
v. Bames Pumps, Inc., 999 F.2d 133, 137 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding written plan terms may not be
modified or superseded by oral assurances or other extrinsic evidence); Musto v. American Gen. Corp.,
861 F.2d 897, 910 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989) (stating that "a written employee
benefit plan may not be modified or superseded by oral undertakings on the part of the employer");
Boyer v. Douglas Components Corp., 986 F.2d 999, 1005 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that "[t]he written
terms of the plan documents control and cannot be modified or superseded by the employer's oral
undertakings'); Russo v. Health, Welfare & Pension Fund, Local 705, 984 F.2d 762, 767 (7th Cir.
1993); Vershaw v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that
"the policies underlying ERISA require a preference for written over oral contract terms"); Lister v.
Stark, 890 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1011 (1990); Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581
F.2d 1266, 1267 n.l (7th Cir. 1978); Alexander v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 990 F.2d 536, 539 (10th Cir.
1993) (holding that the language of the plan controls over oral and written misrepresentations); Miller
v. Coastal Corp., 978 F.2d 622, 624-25 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that coverage of an ERISA plan may
not be expanded by informal oral or written communications under the theory of estoppel), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1586 (1993); Straub v. Western Union Tel. Co., 851 F.2d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir. 1988)
(holding that "no liability exists under ERISA for purported oral modifications of the terms of an
employee benefit plan"); Johnson v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Funds, 513
F.2d 1173, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1975) (stating that benefits may not be enforced according to informal
agreements in a booklet and a letter that are inconsistent with the terms of a written plan); Nacbwalter
v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (1Ith Cir. 1986) (holding that "ERISA precludes oral modifications of
employee benefit plans").
168. 969 F.2d 54, 59 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1051 (1993). See also Singer v.
Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1453-54 (4th Cir. 1992) (Wilkinson, J., concurring). Accord
Hozier v, Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165 n.10 (3d Cir. 1990); Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich
Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1989); Musto, 861 F.2d at 910; Straub v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 851 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 1988); Nachwalter, 805 F.2d at 959-61.
169. Coleman, 969 F.2d at 59.
170. Id. at 56.
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estoppel principles:
would require this court to rewrite the contract of insurance. While a court
should be hesitant to depart from the written terms of a contract under any
circumstances, it is particularly inappropriate in a case involving ERISA,
which places great emphasis upon adherence to the written provisions in an
employee benefit plan.' 71
The court rejected a participant's claim that her insurer was estopped
from denying her benefits because the insurer had misrepresented that she
had coverage. 72  The court stated that if it were to accept the
participant's claim, "the written plan would no longer be the benchmark in
an action under ERISA."' 73
The court noted that "[f]ederal common law... does not grant federal
courts carte blanche authority to 'use state common law to re-write a
federal statute.""' Not only does ERISA require plans to be "estab-
lished and maintained pursuant to a written instrument,"'7' but the written
instrument must describe the formal procedures by which the plan can be
amended.17 1
Similarly, in Musto v. American General Corp., the Sixth Circuit
noted:
It is not always easy to determine exactly what a benefit plan says even when
the language of the plan has been reduced to writing. If the terms of these
often complex plans could be made to depend upon evidence as to oral
statements that may not have been worded very precisely in the first place,
that may have been made many years earlier, and that cannot be proved
except through the testimony of lay witnesses whose memories will seldom
be infallible and who, being human, may have tended to hear what they
wanted to hear, the degree of certainty that Congress sought to provide for
would be utterly impossible to attain.1
171. Id.
172. Id. at 57.
173. Id. at 56.
174. Id. at 58 (quoting Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir.
1990) (quoting Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (11 th Cir. 1986))).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988).
176. Id. § 1102(b)(3).
In Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 6 F.3d 1028, 1034 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Miller v. Coastal Corp.,
978 F.2d 622, 624 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1586 (1993)), the court held that "only
promised benefits adopted in accordance with the amendment procedures outlined in the formal plan
documents will suffice to incorporate the promised benefits into the plan."
177. 861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
178. Musto, 861 F.2d at 910. See also Hammond v. Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 428,
429 (7th Cir. 1992). In Hammond, the Seventh Circuit stated:
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In Singer v. Black & Decker Corp.,'79 the Fourth Circuit held that
"resort to federal common law generally is inappropriate when its
application would conflict with the statutory provisions of ERISA,
discourage employers from implementing plans governed by ERISA, or
threaten to override the explicit terms of an established ERISA benefit
plan." '' t In his concurring opinion, Judge Wilkinson expressed reluc-
tance to expand the terms of the plan through the adoption of federal
common law: "Federal common law does not provide a backdoor through
which these statutory requirements may be evaded, and attempts to import
state common law principles such as equitable or promissory estoppel to
alter and undermine written obligations have been consistently rebuffed by
the courts."''
In a recent case on estoppel, Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp.,82 the Fourth
Circuit continued to follow Coleman and Singer. Although this opinion has
been vacated and the case will be reconsidered, it provides a useful
analysis. The court stated its belief that the concerns expressed in Coleman
and Singer "apply equally to written pre-plan promises made by an
authorized company official regarding pension plans,"' 3 and refused to
apply estoppel to enforce pre-plan promises regarding benefits to be
established under an ERISA plan. 18 4 However, the Fourth Circuit left the
door open for possible adoption of an equitable remedy: "Perhaps under
the proper fact pattern a federal common law fraud theory could be
it is not always easy to determine what a benefit plan says even when the language of the plan
has been reduced to writing. More often than not these instruments are long, complex and far
from complete-and the federal judiciary is inevitably left with the burden of clearing any
unanticipated semantic disputes.
Id.
179. 964 F.2d 1449 (4th Cir. 1992).
180. Id. at 1452.
181. Id. at 1453-54 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
182. 6 F.3d 1028 (4th Cir. 1993), opin. vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 92-1362, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 33294 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 1993).
183. Id. at 1037. The court stated:
If pre-plan statements concerning the proposed terms of a soon-to-be adopted plan were
enforced then "the written plan would no longer be the benchmark in an action under
ERISA," employers would no longer know what their obligations were under their benefit
plans, and employees would be harmed when the actuarial soundness of the employee benefit
plans was destroyed by groups of employees claiming benefits for which no contributions
were made.
Id. (citations omitted).
184. Id.
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incorporated into ERISA's statutory scheme."' 85
Judge Mumaghan dissented. 8 6  He rejected, as "unwarranted," the
"majority's emphasis on adherence to written plans."' 187 Although ERISA
expresses a preference for written plans, Judge Murnaghan noted that
"ERISA does not insist on a written plan when the promise of bringing it
about is still in gestation."' 88
Although ERISA requires that plans be in writing, courts have often held
that a plan is not required to be written. 9  In Donovan v.
Dillingham,9 ° the Eleventh Circuit held that: "in determining whether
a plan, fund or program (pursuant to a writing or not) is a reality, a court
must determine whether from the surrounding circumstances a reasonable
person could ascertain the intended benefits, beneficiaries, source of
financing, and procedures for receiving benefits."' 9' If so, the plan need
not be in writing. A logical extension of Dillingham would be to allow
oral modifications of ERISA plans if a reasonable person can ascertain the
scope of the modification. 9 2  In Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp.,' 93 the
dissent relied on Dillingham and noted that "the written plan does not play
such an exalted role in the statutory scheme that its mere existence and a
fiduciary's adherence to its terms provide an excuse for permitting serious
prior misrepresentations .... "9'
3. Actuarial Soundness
A second reason courts generally refuse to allow modifications of
unambiguous plan provisions is to protect the actuarial soundness of the
185. Id. at 1037 n.17 (citing Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 133-35 (3d Cir.
1993)).
186. 6 F.3d at 1040 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1045.
188. Id.
189. Modzelewski v. Resolution Trust Corp., 14 F.3d 1374, (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion);
Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d. 131, 136 (3rd Cir. 1993); Deibler v. UFCW Local 23, 973 F.2d
206, 209 (3d Cir. 1992); Williams v. Wright, 927 F.2d 1540, 1543-49 (11th Cir. 1991); Scott v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1504 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Henglein v. Informal Plan for Plant Shutdown
Benefits, 974 F.2d 391, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1992).
190. 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982)(en bane).
191. Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1373.
192. See Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 6 F.3d 1028, 1035 (4th Cir. 1993), opin. vacated reh'g en
bane granted, No. 92-1362, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 33294 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 1993), in which the court
acknowledged that an informal plan may give rise to recovery of promised benefits, but held that the
plan at issue was not an independent informal plan that met the requirements of Dillingham.
193. 6 F.3d 1028 (4th Cir. 1993).
194. Id. at 1045 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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plan.1 95 In Cleary v. Graphic Communications International Union
Supplemental Retirement & Disability Fund,196 the First Circuit noted that
"[c]ourts have frequently refused to apply estoppel principles to require
payment of pension funds, usually referring to the basic policy of
protecting the actuarial soundness of pension plans."'97 The "actuarial
soundness" argument is clearly subject to attack with respect to welfare
plans because welfare plans are not even subject to funding standards under
ERISA.'9 8 More recent cases have instead emphasized the "financial
integrity" of the plan. For example, in Pohl v. National Benefits Consul-
tants, Inc., 99 the Seventh Circuit recognized that "[o]ne of ERISA's
purposes is to protect the financial integrity of pension and welfare plans
by confining benefits to the terms of the plans as written."2°° In Coleman
v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co.,201 the Fourth Circuit noted:
The financial integrity of a group health insurer could be quickly compro-
mised if courts compelled the insurer to assume risks for which no premium
was ever paid. Moreover, if courts allowed estoppel to be used to modify
ERISA plans, plan assets could also be chewed up in costly, litigious disputes
over what informal modifications may have been made to a written
instrument.20 2
Yet, in Aitken v. IP & GCU-Employee Retirement Fund,°3 the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the plan's actuarial soundness was irrelevant. The court
stated that because the dispute involved the payment of retirement benefits
in accordance with the terms of the plan (and not punitive damages),
concerns about jeopardizing the plan's actuarial soundness were misplaced.
195. See Coleman, 969 F.2d at 59. See also Armistead v. Vemitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1300
(6th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, Nos. 89-6405, 89-6406, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26,627 (6th Cir. Nov.
5, 1991); Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir. 1990); Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d
52, 55 n.8 (8th Cir. 1976).
196. 841 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1988).
197. Id. at 447 (citing Chambless v. Masters Pension Plan, 772 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986)). See also Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension
Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 963 (1st Cir. 1989); Thurber v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Plan,
542 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1976); Phillips, 542 F.2d at 55 n.8.
198. See Kimberly A. Kralowec, Comment, Estoppel Claims Against ERISA Employee Benefit
Plans, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 463, 532-34 (1992).
199. 956 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1992).
200. Id. at 128. See also Hammond v. Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 428, 429 (7th Cir.
1992).
201. 969 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1051 (1993).
202. Id. at 60.
203. 604 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
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The court stated:
We perceive no substantial danger to the actuarial soundness of the defendant
fund if they are required to pay retirement benefits to the plaintiff in
accordance with the terms of the retirement plan agreement.... Plaintiff
may end up receiving more in benefits from the Fund than the Fund has
received as a result of his contributions, or he may receive less; this is the
expected actuarial risk which the Pension Fund takes with all partici-
pants.
204
4. The Exceptions
A court's decision in a case involving an oral or written representation
which conflicts with the unambiguous plan hinges on many subjective
issues. First, the court must determine whether the plan indeed is
unambiguous. As the dissent noted in Williams v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc.," 5 courts sometimes find that plan language is ambiguous in order
to avoid the harsh result that would occur if the court found that the
language was unambiguous.2" 6 A second subjective issue is whether the
representation interprets or modifies the contract. In Kane, °7 the court
emphasized the difference between interpretations and modifications, but
again, this distinction is not always clear. The Seventh Circuit has
commented on the difficulty in distinguishing between modifications and
interpretations.0 8 The third subjective question is whether the facts of
the case are particularly inequitable.0 9 Some courts have used federal
common law to counteract the harsh effects of inequitable legal results.
Although most circuit courts of appeals have refused to apply estoppel
principles when a plan is unambiguous, 210 some courts have carved out
204. Aitken, 604 F.2d at 1268. The fund refused to pay benefits to Aitken, a participant in a
multiemployer plan and the owner of a printing business. Aitken enrolled in the plan and remitted
contributions on his behalf as an employee. The fund refused to pay Aitken pension benefits when they
realized that he was a sole proprietor and, thus, ineligible to participate in the plan. Id. at 1263-64.
205. 954 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1992).
206. Id. at 1074 (Duh6, J., dissenting).
207. Kane v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 893 F.2d 1283, 1285-86 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 890
(1990).
208. Thomason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 1993).
209. Compare Flacehe v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 958 F.2d 730,736 (6th Cir. 1992)
(denying estoppel when faced with particularly unsympathetic facts) with Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group,
6 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying estoppel when faced with sympathetic facts).
210. Cleary v. Graphic Communications Int'l Union Supplemental Retirement and Disability Fund,
841 F.2d 444 (Ist Cir. 1988); Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1010 (2d Cir. 1993); Chambless v.
Masters Pension Plan, 772 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986);
Haeberle v. Board of Trustees, 624 F.2d 1132, 1139 (2d Cir. 1980); Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic
[VOL. 72:671
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss2/5
SAFEGUARDING PARTICIPANTS' RIGHTS
exceptions under which a plan will be estopped from denying representa-
tions contrary to unambiguous plan language. Often, as cases from the
Second and Third Circuits clearly demonstrate,2 ' exceptions exist when
extraordinary circumstances are present.212
In a footnote in Phillips v. Kennedy,23 the Eighth Circuit stated that
"[t]he actuarial soundness of pension funds is, absent extraordinary
circumstances, too important to permit trustees to obligate the fund to pay
pensions to persons not entitled to them under the express terms of the
pension plan. 214 The Third Circuit relied on this dicta in Rosen v. Hotel
& Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union,215 to hold that the plan
was estopped from denying Rosen his pension.
Although Rosen's employer was required to contribute to a
multiemployer pension fund, the employer never remitted any contributions
to the fund on Rosen's behalf.216 When Rosen discovered this, he paid
the full amount owed on his behalf by his employer.2"7 The plan
administrator accepted this payment."' Rosen assumed that his pension
was secure.
219
When Rosen initially submitted his retirement application, the pension
fund denied it because he had not yet reached the minimum retirement age
of sixty-two. When he reached age sixty-two, Rosen reapplied, and again
his application was denied because his employer had not remitted
contributions on his behalf. The Fund rejected Rosen's payment of five
Co., 924 F.2d 1310 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2856 (1991); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc.,
908 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1990); Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1051 (1993); Rodrigue v. Western & Life Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 969, 971 (5th Cir.
1991); Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1989); Sutter v. BASF Corp.,
964 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1992); Vershaw v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 557 (7th Cir.
1992); Greany v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812, 822 (9th Cir. 1992); Meadows v.
Cagle's, Inc., 954 F.2d 686, 690-91 (11th Cir. 1992); Alday v. Container Corp. of America, 906 F.2d
660 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026 (1991); Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956 (11th
Cir. 1986).
211. Gridle,, 924 F.2d at 1318-19; Lee, 991 F.2d at 1009.
212. Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, 637 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981).
213. 542 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1976).
214. Id. at 55 n.8. See also Thurber v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Plan, 542 F.2d
1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1976).
215. 637 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1981).
216. Id. at 595.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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years earlier as an attempt to cure his employer's delinquencies. Payment,
with interest, was returned.Y°
The Third Circuit held that Rosen detrimentally relied on the plan's
acceptance of his payment of delinquent contributions, and therefore, the
plan was estopped from refusing to give him credit for the contributions.
The court noted that by his actions, Civatte, a trustee of the fund, created
an estoppel against the plan:
Civatte met with Rosen and discussed the threat to his pension by his
employer's failure to contribute; Civatte gave Rosen a tabulation of his
employer's arrearages... ; Rosen made out a check for $419.20-the total
amount of his employer's arrearages; Civatte deposited this money into the
account of the Local 111 pension fund. At this point Rosen had every reason
to believe that his payment had brought his pension up-to-date. Under the
circumstances Rosen's detrimental reliance of Civatte's action was clearly
reasonable.22'
The court flatly stated that no actuarial concerns were present in Rosen's
case; 22 Rosen contributed the same amount as the employer was required
to pay. Because Rosen relied to his detriment on the fund's implied
assurance that his pension was not in jeopardy, the fund was estopped to
deny the benefit. The court cited with approval Scheuer v. Central States
Pension Fund'
The sui generis nature of the pension agreement ... should not immunize it
from the equitable principles that govern similar agreements. The rising
ethical standards in business relations which the estoppel doctrine is designed
to enforce are no less needed in the administration of pension funds... If
anything, estoppel is appropriate here. The complexity of the typical fund
agreement and the trustees' freedom to decide as they wish make it unlikely
that workers will disregard promises made to them.224
The Third Circuit has narrowly construed the "extraordinary" circum-
stances that give rise to equitable estoppel.225 To date, Rosen is the only
case in which the court has found "extraordinary circumstances."
The Eighth Circuit has proceeded cautiously since it first announced the
"extraordinary circumstances" test in the infamous footnote in Phillips v.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 597.
222. Id. at 598 n.9.
223. 358 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
224. Rosen, 637 F.2d at 598 (quoting Scheurer, 358 F. Supp. at 1338).
225. See Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 11I S. Ct.
2856 (1991); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165 n.10 (3d Cir. 1990).
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Kennedy. 2 6 Recently, in Slice v. Norway,"7 the court noted that it had
not yet decided whether principles of estoppel could be applied in an
ERISA case. The Eighth Circuit remanded to the district court to
determine whether a remedy exists under ERISA.228
The Sixth Circuit has taken a different approach. The Sixth Circuit
allows equitable estoppel against welfare funds but refuses to apply
estoppel against retirement funds." 9
In Sutter v. BASF Corp., the Sixth Circuit refused to apply estoppel
principles to an oral misrepresentation concerning retirement benefits.230
Plaintiffs inquired as to benefit amounts before retirement. When they
retired, however, the benefit amounts were considerably less than previous
calculations. Plaintiffs sued their employer, alleging that the employer was
bound to pay the higher amounts.
The court refused to allow an oral modification of the plan: "[t]he
written plan controls, and the employer cannot be estopped on the basis of
oral representations. '231  The court concluded that the misrepresentations
were from "honest mistakes."' 2  The court held that plaintiffs had no
grounds to recover unless they could prove that the employer acted in bad
faith.233
In Armistead v. Vernitron Corp.,"4 the court took a different approach.
Faced with the claims of a group of retirees who sued their employer,
Vernitron Corporation, for failing to provide them with retiree health and
life benefits, the court held that the employer was equitably estopped to
deny these benefits."'
The court recognized the general rule that employee benefit plans cannot
be orally modified.236 The court noted the Eleventh Circuit's concerns
226. 542 F.2d 52, 55 n.8 (8th Cir. 1976).
227. 978 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1992).
228. Id. at 1047. See Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653, 659 (8th Cir. 1992).
229. See Sutter v. BASF Corp., 964 F.2d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 1992) (denying recovery under
promissory estoppel theory for mispresentations concerning retirement plan); Armistead v. Vemitron
Corp., 944 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir.) (estoppel with respect to retiree health benefits), reh 'g en banc denied,
Nos. 89-6405, 89-6406, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26,627 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1991).
230. 964 F.2d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 1992).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 944 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, Nos. 89-6405, 89-6406, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26,627 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1991).
235. Id. at 1300.
236. Id. at 1299.
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that "if oral modifications were permitted, the rights of other plan
participants would be jeopardized by unrecorded oral agreements between
plan officers and favored plan participants. '237  Because the financial
security of retirement funds could be undercut by preferential disbursements
238to participants, Congress required that plan amendments be in writing.
The court noted that concerns about the financial stability of the plan
apply primarily to retirement benefits, not welfare benefits.239  Because
pension contributions are calculated on the basis of actuarial assumptions,
a change in the terms of the plan may affect the actuarial assumptions.
However, insured welfare plans are not determined actuarially. The
employer pays premiums based on a risk analysis. Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit held that with respect to insured welfare benefit plans, estoppel will
not frustrate congressional intent. The court held that because the insurance
benefits were unfunded, there was no concern for the actuarial soundness
of the plan, and equitable estoppel was appropriate.24
The Seventh Circuit adopted a similar approach in Black v. TIC
Investment Corp., 24 a case concerning a severance plan. The court noted
that although pension plans have strict funding, vesting, and benefit accrual
standards, welfare funds have no such requirements.242 With respect to
unfunded welfare plans, "there is no particular fund that is depleted by
paying benefits. Thus there is no need for concern about the plan's
actuarial soundness. 243
In contrast, the Third and Fourth Circuits have refused to draw a
distinction between pension and welfare benefit plans.2' The Third
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1300. The Sixth Circuit found that Nachwalter meant that:
Congress's purpose in requiring that benefit plans be in writing can only be served if the plan
is enforced as written. When a party is estopped from asserting a right in a written plan, the
plan as enforced is not the same as the plan as written. For this reason, ERISA would seem
to preclude application of equitable estoppel to disputes over benefit plans under the statute.
Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. In Kaniewski v. Equitable Life Ins. Soc'y, No. 92-3604, 1993 WL 88200, at * 5 (6th Cir.
Mar. 26, 1993) (unpublished opinion), the Sixth Circuit summarized its prior ruling in Armilstead
"[W]here an employee welfare benefit plan, such as health insurance, was at issue, and where the
actuarial soundness of the fund was not implicated, the principles of equitable estoppel under the federal
common law [are] ... applicable." Id.
241. 900 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1990).
242. Id. at 115.
243. Id.
244. Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1163; Salomon v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 659,
660-61 (4th Cir. 1986); Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1986).
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Circuit has said: "When Congress wanted to exempt welfare plans from
regulations it imposed on pension plans, it knew full well how to do
sO.
' 245
5. Multiemployer Plans
Courts also consider multiemployer plans in a different light from single
employer plans.246 Courts typically disallow estoppel in multiemployer
pension plans. The rationale is that multiemployer Taft-Hartley funds
involve one plan to which many, perhaps hundreds, of employers
contribute. Multiemployer plans are typically set up in unionized
occupations in which the employees rotate jobs among various union
employers. Although the employee changes from job to job (for example,
in construction-related jobs), each employer makes contributions into the
multiemployer plan on behalf of the employee. The plan is jointly
administered by union and employer representatives. Courts have
expressed concerns about applying estoppel in a plan under which so many
different employers could potentially bind the plan:
To allow one employer to bind the fund to pay benefits outside the strict
terms of the Plan would be to make all the employers pay for one employer's
misrepresentations, and to the extent that such payments damage the actuarial
soundness of the Plan, it hurts all the employees as well. 47
In Black v. TIC Investment Corp.,248 the Seventh Circuit found that
because the plan was a single employer plan and there was "no danger that
others associated with the Plan can be hurt,"249 estoppel was appropriate.
The court said, "There is no reason for the employee who reasonably relied
to his detriment on his employer's false representations to suffer. '250
Therefore, the Court held that "estoppel principles are applicable to claims
for benefits under unfunded single-employer welfare benefit plans."'"
More recently in Russo v. Health, Welfare & Pension Fund, Local
245. Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1163.
246. Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir. 1990). See also BRUCE, supra note 65,
at 404.
247. Black, 900 F.2d at 115. This potential problem can be eliminated by only permitting estoppel
based on representations made by plan representatives, not employer representatives.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. The Court expressed "no opinion as to the application of estoppel principles in other
situations." Id.
19941
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705,'5 2 the Seventh Circuit noted that the concerns about actuarial
soundness raised in Black "would argue against applying estoppel to a
multi-employer funded pension plan." 3
Yet in Scheuer v. Central States Pension Fund,254 a district court held
that a jury question existed as to whether a multiemployer plan should be
estopped from denying benefits under the theory of apparent agency when
the plan accepted contributions and the union's business agent represented
that coverage would be provided to an independent contractor.255 And
in Hurd v. Hutnik,56 a district court held that contributing employers to
a multiemployer plan were required to continue making contributions after
the plan was terminated in favor of single employer plans because the
employers had misrepresented that retirees would get lifetime benefits.257
D. Harsh Results: Participants Left Without a Remedy
This is a hard case-hard not in the sense that it is legally difficult or
tough to crack, but in the sense that it requires us, like the court below, to
deny relief to a plaintiff for whom we have considerable sympathy. We do
what we must, for "it is the duty of all courts of justice to take care, for the
general good of the community, that hard cases do not make bad law."258
Many courts have described the plight of participants who have been
"betrayed without remedy." '259 Most courts have held that ERISA
preempts state law claims even if a plaintiff is left without recourse.26°
One court bluntly stated that appellant "seems to argue that because he has
252. 984 F.2d 762 (7th Cir. 1993).
253. Id. at 767 n.4.
254. 358 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
255. rd. at 1340.
256. 419 F. Supp. 630 (D.N.J. 1976).
257. Id. at 656. See also Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union Pension
Fund, 637 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981).
258. Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 873 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting
United States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37, 49 (1877) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Lord Campbell in East
Indian Co. v. Paul, 7 Moo. P.C.C. 111)).
259. Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989).
260. Cases in which courts have found no remedy include Sanson v. General Motors Corp., 966
F.2d 618, 622 (1 1th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993); First Nat'l Life Ins. v. Sunshine-
Jr. Food Stores, 960 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993); Lee v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 894 F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1990); Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1011 (1990). However, in Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697
(Ist Cir. 1994), the First Circuit held that a former employee had standing to sue as a participant, in
part, because ERISA precludes "all other judicial recourse" and preemption would "clearly frustrate
Congress' intention to remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles to such claims." Id. at * 5.
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no remedy, we must find ERISA doesn't apply. Under the law, however,
ERISA preempts state law claims even if the plaintiff is left without a
remedy."26  In order to show the inequities caused by the gap left by
ERISA's preemption clause, this Article will examine a few of the cases
with the harshest results.
Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc.,262 is a particularly troublesome
case. "Florence Corcoran, a long-time employee of South Central Bell
Telephone Company" became pregnant.263 She was a participant in
Bell's Medical Assistance Plan, a self-funded plan.264 The plan was
261. Dockter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 91-56029, 1993 WL 55150, at *2 (9th Cir. March 3,
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 310 (1993).
See also Lister, 890 F.2d at 946 ("[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for
federal preemption."); Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Distasteful as it is to
conclude that people who prudently secured insurance may be left nevertheless exposed to the risk, this
suit does not open an avenue to recovery."); Custer v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 418-19
(4th Cir. 1993) (Plaintiff's contention "that ERISA provides no remedy ... leaving a gap is, in our
view immaterial .... The Act's preemption clause does not place the analysis on whether remedies
are provided by the Act, but rather on whether the action relates to any employee benefit plan."); Smith
v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Similarly unavailing is appellant's argument that
ERISA preemption will leave him with no adequate remedy .... Other circuits addressing this issue
have held that the preclusion of remedy does not bar the operation of ERISA preemption."). But see
Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that preemption should
apply to a state law claim only if Congress has provided a remedy for the wrong asserted), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 1093 (1990).
The Ninth Circuit recently rejected a participant's claim that this gap is unconstitutional and violates
the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial in suits at common law. Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d
853, 858 (9th Cir. 1993). The participant claimed that "Congress may not take away a plaintiffs legal
claim under state law and replace it with a federal claim that is only equitable in nature." Id. The
Court responded: "Congress surely can preempt a state cause of action, be it legal or equitable: This
is the very nature of federal supremacy. Once Congress has chosen to preempt the state claim, it's free
to give affected individuals a full federal claim, a claim providing only for remedies limited to equity,
a damages claim only, or no claim at all." Id. Under precedent in most jurisdictions, this leaves
participants with "no claim at all." Id.
262. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
263. Id. at 1322.
264. Self-funded plans create another disturbing problem which could be the subject of an entire
article. Motivated by escalating health insurance premiums, record numbers of employers have canceled
their medical policies and converted to self-insured plans. The primary reason cited for conversion to
self-insurance is that self-insured plans are not subject to state regulation, which drives up the cost of
providing medical coverage.
ERISA's preemption clause encourages plan sponsors to self-insure health benefits. Insurance
companies which issue health policies are subject to state mandated benefit laws while self-insured plans
are not required to comply with these laws. ERISA § 514(a) preempts all state laws which relate to
an ERISA-covered employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988). The insurance saving clause,
found in ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), provides that nothing in ERISA "shall be construed to exempt or
relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 29
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administered by Blue Cross.265
In her last months of pregnancy, Corcoran's obstetrician advised that she
have complete bed rest for the remainder of her pregnancy.2 66  Mrs.
Corcoran applied for temporary disability under Bell's plan but benefits
were denied.26 Her obstetrician advised the plan that Corcoran had a
"26816
"high risk pregnancy.' ' Again, Bell denied the disability benefits.269
Bell solicited a second opinion from another obstetrician. The second
doctor did not examine Mrs. Corcoran; he reviewed her medical re-
cords.2 ' In fact, Mrs. Corcoran and her obstetrician did not even know
that a second opinion had been sought.27 ' The second doctor stated that
Bell "would be at considerable risk by denying her doctor's recommenda-
tion.°2 7
2
By order of her obstetrician, Mrs. Corcoran was hospitalized near the end
of her pregnancy so that her doctor could monitor the fetus continuous-
ly.273 The obstetrician sought precertification for the hospital stay, as
required by the plan's Quality Care Program, which is administered by
United HealthCare.274 United HealthCare determined that Mrs. Corcoran
did not need to be hospitalized, and authorized ten hours per day of home
nursing care. 5  Mrs. Corcoran entered the hospital on October 3, 1989.
When United HealthCare did not precertify her stay, she returned home on
October 12.276 Almost two weeks later, during a time "when no nurse
was on duty, the fetus went into distress and died. 277
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988). In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985),
the Supreme Court held that a state law that required an insurer to provide mandated mental health
benefits was not preempted by ERISA, as it fell within the saving clause. Id. at 758. However, the
Court noted that ERISA's deemer clause subjects insured and self-insured plans to different regulation.
Id. at 747. The deemer clause provides that an ERISA-govemed employee benefit plan shall not be
deemed an insurance company. 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(2)(B) (1988). As a result, insured plans are
treated differently from self-insured plans. Insured plans are subject to state regulation while self-
insured plans are not governed by state insurance laws.
265. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1323.
266. Id. at 1322.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 965 F.2d at 1323.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1322-23.
274. Id. at 1323.
275. 965 F.2d at 1324.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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The Corcorans sued Blue Cross and United HealthCare for wrongful
death under state law. 78  The district court granted summary judgment
for Blue Cross and United HealthCare, stating that ERISA preempts state
court claims that "relate to" employee benefit plans .1 9  Because Blue
Cross and United HealthCare would have played no role in Mrs. Corcoran's
pregnancy but for the ERISA plan, the district court held that the claim was
preempted: "because the ERISA plan was the source of the relationship
between the Corcorans and the defendants, the Corcorans' attempt to
distinguish United [HealthCare's] role in paying claims from its role as a
source of professional medical advice was unconvincing.""28 The court
also rejected the Corcorans' argument that they were entitled to compensa-
tory or consequential damages for emotional distress or other claims
beyond medical expenses covered by the plan.28t
The Fifth Circuit affirmed.282 The Corcorans had sued under a
Louisiana wrongful death statute which allows parents to sue for the
wrongful death of their unborn children and imposes liability on health care
providers who fail to meet an applicable standard of care.283  The Fifth
Circuit noted that this was a case of first impression whether the Louisiana
wrongful death statute allows recovery against a negligent utilization review
company.284
First, the court looked at the preemption issue. The court held that the
wrongful death claim brought by the Corcorans did not fall under a law
278. The Corcorans alleged that "Blue Cross wrongfully denied appropriate medical care, failed
adequately to oversee the medical decisions of United, and failed to provide United with Mrs.
Corcoran's complete medical background. They alleged that United wrongfully denied the medical care
recommended by Dr. Collins [Corcoran's obstetrician] and wrongfully determined that home nursing
care was adequate for her condition." Id. at 1326. Later the Corcorans dropped the claims against Blue
Cross. Id.
279. 965 F.2d at 1325.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1338. The court also noted that "a prerequisite to recovery under § 502(a)(3) is a
violation of the terms of ERISA itself. ERISA does not place upon the defendants a substantive
responsibility in connection with the provision of medical advice which, if breached, would support a
claim under § 502(a)(3)." Id. at 1326.
282. Id. at 1339.
283. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1979); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633, 637-38 (La.
1981); Chivleatto v. Divinity, 379 So. 2d 784, 786 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
284. The court noted that California is the only state that has expressly permitted suits against a
utilization review company based on a negligent decision as to the medical care provided. Corcoran,
965 F.2d at 1327. See, e.g., Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 883-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990);
Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing liability of insurance
company, but placing primary liability with treating physicians), cert. granted, 727 P.2d 753 (Cal.
1986); review dismissed and cause remanded, 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987).
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"specifically designed" to affect ERISA plans.285 However, the claim has
"an effect on" an ERISA plan.286 The court ruled that because United
HealthCare made medical decisions in the context of making a decision
about the availability of benefits under the plan, the wrongful death action
was preempted by ERISA.287
The court noted that the:
absence of a remedy under ERISA's civil enforcement scheme for medical
malpractice committed in connection with a plan benefit determination does
not alter our conclusion. While we are not unmindful of the fact that our
interpretation of the pre-emption clause leaves a gap in remedies within a
statute intended to protect participants in employee benefit plans, the lack of
an ERISA remedy does not affect a pre-emption analysis.28
The court concluded that "[t]he result ERISA compels us to reach means
that the Corcorans have no remedy, state or federal, for what may have
been a serious mistake. This is troubling .... "289 The court called for
"a reevaluation of ERISA so that it can continue to serve its noble purpose
of safeguarding the interests of employees."29
Another case that resounds with unfairness is Sanson v. General Motors
Corp., an Eleventh Circuit case.291 Sanson, an employee at General
Motors' Lakewood plant, was contemplating retirement. He asked whether
a special retirement program would be offered to employees of the
Lakewood plant and was advised that no such benefits would be offered.
Relying on this representation, Sanson retired.292 Shortly after Sanson
retired, GM offered the special retirement program to certain Lakewood
employees.293 When Sanson discovered this, he called GM and demand-
ed that his retirement benefits be increased to include the special bene-
fits.294 GM refused his request, and Sanson sued to recover the enhanced
benefits and compensatory and punitive damages.
285. The wrongful death statute "neither make[s] explicit reference to nor [is] premised on the
existence of an ERISA plan." Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1329.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1331. "In our view, United [HealthCare] makes medical decisions as part and parcel
of its mandate to decide what benefits are available under the Bell plan." Id. at 1332.
288. Id. at 1333 (citations omitted).
289. Id. at 1338.
290. Id. The court acknowledged that this task is allocated "to Congress, not the courts." Id. at
1339.
291. 966 F.2d 618 (1lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
292. Id. at 619.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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Initially, the district court held that the state law claim was not
preempted:295  "The fact that the misrepresentations concerned the
availability of an employee benefit plan is only incidental to plaintiff's
claim.... [Therefore] plaintiff's claim for intentional misrepresentation
is not preempted by ERISA. 296  Subsequently, the United States Su-
preme Court issued its decision in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,2 97
and the district court reconsidered. Based on Ingersoll-Rand, the court held
that Sanson's claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was preempted by
ER.ISA. 29 8
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court considered Sanson's argument
that "there must be some avenue whereby an individual who is defrauded
out of pension benefits can obtain a remedy."2 99  The court rejected
Sanson's plea to create a federal common-law fraud under ERISA. The
court noted: "[t]he Supreme Court has previously considered and rejected
such an extension of the remedies guaranteed under ERISA."3°°
The Court also rebuffed Sanson's contention that "Congress specifically
contemplated that federal courts, in the interests of justice, would engage
in interstitial lawmaking in ERISA cases in much the same way as the
courts fashioned a federal common law of labor relations under § 301 of
the LMRA."' '3  The Court refused to create a federal common-law
remedy for Sanson."2
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
298. Sanson, 966 F.2d at 620.
299. Id. at 621.
300. Id. at 622. In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987), the Supreme Court
observed that:
The detailed provisions of § 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that
represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures
against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans. The policy
choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the
federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries
were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.
Id.
301. Sanson, 966 F.2d at 622. See Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879
F.2d 957, 966 (1st Cir. 1989).
302. Sanson, 966 F.2d at 622. Other courts have created federal common law. See Provident Life
& Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982 (1990) (creating
federal common-law rule on unjust enrichment to recover monies advanced to plan participant);
Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d
221 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986) (creating federal common law to find cause of action
for employer to recover payments mistakenly made to fund).
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Judge Birch dissented. He noted that "this case represents the point at
which the preemption tide should be stayed. A finding of preemption in
this case not only fails to further any such protective policy,. . . [it] stands
the entire statutory scheme on its proverbial head."3 3  Judge Birch
continued:
I do not subscribe to the view that for every wrong there must necessarily be
a remedy. However, where there is a remedy (here a state fraud action), I
find it is difficult to comprehend, in a common sense way, how a law enacted
to protect the very class of individuals into which the appellant squarely fits
can be construed to deny him such a preexisting remedy."'
Another disturbing case is Olson v. General Dynamics Corp.,305 a
Ninth Circuit case. Olson was a long-time employee of General Dynam-
ics.3 06 In 1986, General Dynamics sold a division to Amex Systems, Inc.
Olson was an employee in the division that was sold.3 7 At the time of
the sale, executives of both companies told Olson and other employees that
they would be offered jobs with Amex.3"8  Amex's president told Olson
and other employees: "I commit to you that in no way will you be injured.
On the bottom line, you will be equal or better to [sic] your present posi-
tion."30 9
Olson accepted Amex's offer of employment in April 1986. In June
1988, Olson retired. Upon retirement, he received benefits that were less
than he expected and less than the level of benefits represented to him at
the time of the sale. He brought a common-law fraud claim for misrepre-
sentation against his former employers.
The district court held that ERISA preempted Olson's fraud claim and
the Fifth Circuit affirmed.31  The court stated: "Given the Supreme
Court's directive that ERISA's preemption provision is to be construed
broadly, it is difficult to see how Olson's fraud claim could be found not
to 'relate to' an employee benefit plan."31  Judge Reinhardt, concurring,
303. Sanson, 966 F.2d at 623 (Birch, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 623 n.2. Judge Birch stated: "I am concerned that by adopting such a judicial
construction, a court could interpret its way into the province of the legislative branch, and in so doing
thwart what Congress set out to accomplish in the first place." Id.
305. 960 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2968 (1992).
306. Id. at 1419.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. 960 F.2d at 1420.
311. Id. at 1421.
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observed that:
Because of the passage of ERISA, Olson is left without a remedy.
Unfortunately, his fate is not unique."2
As the court's decision in this case illustrates, however, a statute designed
to safeguard employee retirement benefits has, all too frequently, been used
to deprive employees of rights they previously enjoyed under state law while
failing to provide any comparable federal remedy.313
The proliferation of ERISA preemption cases, in my view, raises a
question as to whether ERISA is having an effect that is substantially
contrary to that intended by those who favored its adoption. This a matter
which Congress may wish to examine carefully.3t4
III. RIGHTING WRONGS: EXPANDING FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND
ENACTING LEGISLATION TO SAFEGUARD PARTICIPANTS' RIGHTS
A. Application of Federal Common Law Theories Such as Estoppel
In International Resources, Inc. v. New York Life Insurance Co.,315 the
Sixth Circuit succinctly stated: "ERISA will not preempt state law claims
based on wrongs for which ERISA provides no remedy. However, where
rights are guaranteed by ERISA, the remedy for such rights under ERISA
is exclusive. 31 6  The court refused to preempt a claim alleging that a
312. Id. at 1423 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
313. Id. at 1423-24.
314. Id. at 1424.
In a dissenting opinion in another case Judge Murnaghan stated:
I am loathe to conclude that a company may, with impunity, make representations to its
employees about a benefits plan-with the implicit purpose of assuring employees that their
benefits will be enhanced if a proposed leveraged buy-out is successful-and then renege on
those promises when the LBO is effectuated and the plan is adopted. The majority's approach
allows (and perhaps invites) employers to make promises to employees about a plan still in
gestation thereby eliciting desired behavior, and then disallow those promises and hide behind
the protection of a written plan which does not incorporate the promises made. Such a result
would make a mockery of the most fundamental canon of the ERISA statutory scheme-that [of
fiduciary responsibility].
Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 6 F.3d 1028, 1042 (4th Cir. 1993), vacated, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 33,294
(4th Cir. Dec. 13, 1993) (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
315. 950 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 294 (1992).
316. Id. at 298 (citing Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990)). See also Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
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conversion policy did not conform to state law.3 t7 Most courts do not
take such an expansive position. However, courts have applied federal
common law in ERISA cases in a variety of matters, with respect to
indemnity and contribution,3"' return of overpaid employer contribu-
tions,3t 9 unjust enrichment,320 contra proferentum,32" ' piercing the cor-
porate veil,322  set-off, 3  restitution,324  and coordination of bene-
fits. 3
25
Many courts also have applied estoppel to prevent inequitable results
under ERISA.326 As the court stated in Hurd v. Hutnik,327 "[a] court
317. International Resources, 950 F.2d at 300.
318. Cullen v. Riley (In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & IRAP Litigation), 957 F.2d
1020, 1029 (2d Cir. 1992); Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Maryland, 939 F.2d 12, 16, 18
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3014 (1992). But see Call v. Sumitomo Bank, 881 F.2d 626
(9th Cir. 1989).
319. UIU Severance Pay Trust Fund v. Local Union No. 18-U, 998 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1993);
Maiden Mills Indus., Inc. v. Alman, 971 F.2d 768, 774 (1st Cir. 1992); Jamail, Inc. v. Carpenters Dist.
Council Pension & Welfare Trusts, 954 F.2d 299,304 (5th Cir. 1992); Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv.
Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 966 (1st Cir. 1989); Plucinski v. I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund,
875 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (3d Cir. 1989); Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986); South
Cent. United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. C & G Markets, Inc., 836 F.2d 221 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
320. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 993 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 982 (1990); Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943,
950 (D. Del. 1985). Contra Morales v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 914 F.2d 83, 87 (5th Cir. 1990); Lea
v. Republic Airlines, Inc., 903 F.2d 624, 632 (9th Cir. 1990); Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 6 F.3d 1028,
1038 (4th Cir. 1993) opin. vacated, reh'g en banc. granted, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 33,294 (4th Cir.
Dec. 13, 1993).
321. See cases cited supra note 145.
322. United Elec., Radio and Machine Vorkers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1092 (1st
Cir. 1992); Massachusetts Laborers' Health & Welfare Fund v. Starrett Paving Corp., 845 F.2d 23, 27
(1st Cir. 1988).
323. Coar v. Kazimir, 990 F.2d 1413, 1418 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 179 (1993).
324. Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1186 (3d Cir.
1991). But see British Motor Car Distribs., Ltd. v. San Francisco Automotive Indus. Welfare Fund, 882
F.2d 371, 377 (9th Cir. 1989).
325. PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. Western Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir.
1992) ("Adoption of a uniform federal rule avoids such confusion and expense, and thus best serves
the purposes of ERISA."); Reinforcing Iron Workers v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 746 F. Supp. 668, 670-
71 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
326. Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, 637 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981); Black v. TIC Investment Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1990);
Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, 625 F.2d 1344, 1355 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying promissory
estoppel); Aitken v. IP&GCU-Employer Retirement Fund, 604 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979); Bolton v.
Construction Laborers' Pension Trust, 954 F.2d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir. 1992); Dockray v. Phelps Dodge
Corp., 801 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1986) (case remanded to determine if plan administrator was
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of equity will not permit the reasonable and justified expectations of...
employees, knowingly wielded by the employers for whom they labored for
so many years, to be frustrated .... Typically, in order to prove
estoppel, the participant must show:
(1) conduct or language amounting to a representation of material fact;
(2) awareness of the true facts by the party to be estopped;
(3) an intention on the part of the party to be estopped that the representation
be acted on, or conduct toward the party asserting the estoppel such that the
latter has a right to believe that the former's conduct is so intended;
(4) unawareness of the true facts by the party asserting the estoppel; and
(5) detrimental and justifiable reliance by the party asserting estoppel on the
representation.329
Lack of reliance often bars recovery on estoppel claims.330 In
Nachivalter v. Christie,33' the district court refused to apply estoppel
principles because the participant was familiar with the terms of the
plan.332 Reliance may be inferred if an employee continues to work after
a representation as to benefits has been made.333
Most estoppel cases have failed because the participant did not meet her
or his burden of proof.334 However, a few courts provide guidance on the
development of estoppel under the federal common law of ERISA.
estopped). But see Watkins v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1993), a post-Mertens
case in which the Ninth Circuit reconsidered equitable estoppel in light of Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993). See BRUCE, supra note 65, at 402-403, for discussion of circumstances under
which estoppel has been granted by district courts.
327. 419 F. Supp. 630 (D.N.J. 1976).
328. Id. at 655.
329. Tregoning v. American Community Mut. Ins. Co., No. 92-2253, 1993 WL 522368, at *4 (6th
Cir. Dec. 17, 1993) (citing Armistead v. Vemitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1298 (6th Cir. 1991)).
330. See Russo v. Health, Welfare & Pension Fund, Local 705, 984 F.2d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that "estoppel arises when one party has made a misleading representation to another party and
the other has reasonably relied to his detriment on that representation") (quoting Black v. TIC
Investment, Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir. 1990)). See also Vershaw v. Northwestern Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1992); Gordon v. ILWU-PMA Benefit Funds, 616 F.2d 433, 439
(9th Cir. 1980).
331. 611 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 805 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 1986).
332. Id. at 663-64.
333. See Monson v. Century Mfg. Co., 739 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1984); Novembre v. Local
584 Pension Fund, 4 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1286 (D.N.J. 1981), affid, 691 F.2d 491 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983).
334. See, e.g., Tregoning v. American Community Mut. Ins. Co., No. 92-2253, 1993 WL 522368,
at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 1993); Cleary v. Graphic Communications Int'l Union Supplemental Retirement
& Disability Fund, 841 F.2d 444, 448 (1st Cir. 1988); Lodge v. Shell Oil Co,, 747 F.2d 16 (Ist Cir.
1984); Haeberle v. Board of Trustees 624 F.2d 1132, 1139 (2d Cir. 1980).
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In Thomason v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 335 the Seventh Circuit held
that courts may develop a federal common law of ERISA "only where
ERISA itself 'does not expressly address the issue before the court.' 336
While courts may incorporate state common law "as a basis for new federal
common law,"337 state law is relevant only if it is consistent with the
congressional concerns underlying ERISA. The court noted: "The ultimate
objective is not to fulfill policy objectives of state law but to fulfill the
congressional command embodied in the language and structure of the
federal statute. '338  The court cautioned that the federal common law of
ERISA will not always provide a remedy for a state law that has been
preempted.339
In Nash v. Trustees of Boston University,30 the First Circuit allowed
the affirmative defense of fraud-in-the-inducement to be asserted against a
plan participant. Nash, a tenured professor at Boston University, was
notified by the University that his program would be discontinued and he
would be discharged if no suitable position was available. 34' After
receiving this notice, Nash received an offer of employment from the
Rhode Island School of Design. He then commenced negotiations with
Boston University over early retirement. Although representatives of
Boston University specifically asked Nash about the Rhode Island job,
Nash misrepresented the status of the job offer. He said, "I kept them
335. 9 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1993).
336. Id. at 647 (quoting Nachwalter v. Christe, 805 F.2d 956, 949 (11 th Cir. 1986)). In Jones v.
UOP, Nos. 93-2046, 93-2205, 1994 WL 20660 (7th Cir. Jan. 27, 1994), the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed
that estoppel is appropriate under certain circumstances. Id. at * 4. However, Judge Posner cautioned
that: "The statute is plain and severe and ought not be stretched beyond what is possible with the use
of familiar, clear, tested, administrable doctrines-such as equitable estoppel-for preventing the
evasion of legal duties." Id.
337. Jones, Nos. 93-2046, 93-2205, 1994 WL 20660, at *4.
338. Id. (quoting Fox Valley & Vicinity Construction Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d
275, 284 (7th Cir.) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 820 (1990). See also Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982 (1990). In
Waller, the court stated that:
Despite the power of federal courts to fill in the interstices of ERISA, we must respect the
fact that Congress in creating ERISA has 'established an extensive regulatory network and
has expressly announced its intention to occupy the field.' Accordingly, we must proceed
cautiously in creating additional rights under the rubric of federal common law, and remember
that we do not possess carte blanche authority to 'use state common law to re-write a federal
statute.'
Id. at 992 (citations omitted).
339. Id.
340. 946 F.2d 960 (1st Cir. 1991).
341. Id. at 961.
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waiting too long; they are talking to another candidate. 342  In the
meantime, Nash accepted the Rhode Island job. Two weeks later, Boston
University agreed to pay Nash $88,230 in early retirement benefits.
Nash sued Boston University for breach of contract and for a violation
of ERISA. The University claimed fraud-in-the-inducement as an
affirmative defense. The First Circuit allowed the defense under federal
common law. The court recognized that Congress, in enacting ERISA,
intended that federal courts "would engage in interstitial lawmaking" in
order to achieve justice.343
The court held that the "legislative purpose and public policy activating
ERISA would be advanced by accommodating the affirmative defense of
fraud-in-the-inducement within the developing reserve of federal common-
law."3" The court noted that if a common-law remedy were not recog-
nized an unscrupulous employer could bind an employer to a fraudulently
induced contract. 45
In Black v. TIC Investment Corp.,346 the Seventh Circuit applied
estoppel. Black was employed by White Farm Equipment Company and
was a participant in the company's severance plan. In 1980, the corpora-
tion filed for bankruptcy and suspended its severance plan. Later that year,
the company was sold to TIC Investment Corporation.
In 1981, Black was notified that the severance plan would be terminated.
Later, he was terminated and was offered the opportunity to immediately
receive two month's salary continuation or to file a claim in bankruptcy
court for $18,469 in severance pay. Black filed a bankruptcy claim. His
employer objected to his claim, and it was still pending in the bankruptcy
court at the time of this hearing.
Black sued, claiming that TIC Investment Corporation breached its
fiduciary duty by objecting to his bankruptcy claim, and therefore, was
342. Id. at 962.
343. Id. at 965. The court quoted Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957), a case arising under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act:
[Some legal problems] will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will
lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation
and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness
will be determined by the nature of the problem.
Nash, 946 F.2d at 965.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 966. "We are ... loath to think that Congress meant to institutionalize ... permitting
employee participants to sponge off an employer's good-faith bevues." Id. (quoting Kwatcher v.
Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 966 (1st Cir. 1989)).
346. 900 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1990).
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estopped to deny the validity of his claim. The court first looked at
ERISA and determined that ERISA did not regulate the case. The court
found that "there is no good reason to breach the general rule that
misrepresentations give rise to an estoppel. There is no reason for the
employee who reasonably relied to his detriment on his employer's false
representations to suffer."347 The court held that estoppel principles were
applicable to claims for benefits under an unfunded single employer welfare
benefit plan.34
8
The court's rationale in these estoppel cases is in line with congressional
intent, as expressed in the legislative history of ERISA:
In the absence of adequate federal standards, the participant is left to rely
on the traditional equitable remedies of the common law of trusts ....
The fact that statutory rules exist says little as to their efficacy in adjusting
inequities that are visited upon plan participants [who] ... lose their benefits
not because of some violation of federal law, but rather because of the
manner in which the plan is executed.... Courts ... are reluctant to apply
concepts of equitable relief or to disregard technical document wording. 49
Congress intended that courts would adopt broad remedies to redress
violations of ERISA. The legislative intent was "to provide the full range
of legal and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts.
"2350
More recent legislative history is even clearer: "Federal courts [have
authority] to shape legal and equitable remedies to fit the facts and
circumstances of the cases before them, even though those remedies may
not be specifically mentioned in ERISA itself."35'
Certainly, legislative history supports the adoption of federal common-
law remedies under ERISA. Hard cases do not have to make bad law;
courts can create a remedy for the participant who has been unfairly
wronged and is caught in the gap between preempted state law and
nonexistent federal law.
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA
Another avenue of recourse for participants is to file a suit for breach of
347. Id. at 115.
348. Id.
349. H.R. REP. NO. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643.
350. Id. at 4655. See also id. at 4839 (stating that goal is to provide "adequate remedies"). See
id. at 4871 (concerning remedies in general).
351. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 101ST CONO., IST SESS. 55 (to
accompany H.R. 3299 (1989)).
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fiduciary duty under ERISA. As previously discussed, ERISA section
502(a)(2), in conjunction with section 409, authorizes a participant to sue
for a breach of the fiduciary duty described in section 404(a). However,
although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the availability of extra-
contractual damages under section 502(a)(2), most courts have denied
recovery of such damages. Another deterrent is the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, in which
the Supreme Court held that section 409(a) only provides relief to the plan
and not to individual participants.352 Many circuits have rejected partici-
pant claims for breach of fiduciary duty because the participant cannot
recover under ERISA section 409."'
Some participants have avoided this result by directly alleging violations
of ERISA section 404(a)(1), the prudence rule,354 instead of section
409.35' Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in Russell,356 held that
"[s]ection 502(a)(3) authorizes the award of 'appropriate equitable relief'
directly to a participant or beneficiary to 'redress' any act or practice which
violates any provision of this title"' such as a breach of the fiduciary duties
set forth in section 404(a)." 7  In Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Team-
sters Health & Welfare Fund, the Third Circuit recently relied on Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in Russell and held that a participant can
recover for breach of fiduciary duty under sections "404(a) and
502(a)(3)(B) for failure to provide complete and accurate material
information to its beneficiaries.""35 The court did not discuss Mertens,
352. 473 U.S. 134, 140-44 (1985). The Supreme Court held that"the entire text of § 409 persuades
us that Congress did not intend that section to authorize any relief [for breach of fiduciary duty] except
to the plan itself." Id.
353. Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1162 n.7 (3d Cir. 1990); Tregoning v.
American Community Mutual Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 79 (6th Cir. 1993); Richards v. General Motors Corp.,
991 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1993); Bryant v. Int'l Fruit Prod. Co., 886 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1989); Anweiler
v. American Elec. Power Service Corp., 3 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1993); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992); Watkins v. Westinghouse Hanford, 12 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir.
1993); Williams v. Caterpillar, Inc., 944 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1991); Sokol v. Berstein, 803 F.2d 532, 535
(9th Cir. 1987); Simmons v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 940 F.2d 614, 617 (1 1th Cir. 1991); Local Union
2134, United Mine Workers v. Powhatan Fuel, Inc., 828 F.2d 710 (11 th Cir. 1987).
354. 29 U.S.C. § I104(a)(1) (1988).
355. Bixler v. Central Penn. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1299 (3d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2416 (1993); Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1993);
Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1993); Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858
F.2d 1154 (6th Cir. 1988); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
356. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
357. Id. at 153.
358. 12 F.3d 1292, 1298-99, 1301 (3d. Cir. 1993).
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in which the Supreme Court held that money damages are not available
under section 502(a)(3).
The Seventh Circuit took a slightly different approach in Anweiler v.
American Electric Power Service Corp.,359 a post-Mertens case. The
court held that a participant who was claiming a breach of fiduciary duty
"cannot attempt to restyle her action as a personal claim for benefits [under
section 502(a)(1)(B)] when she has continually alleged a breach of
fiduciary duty.""36  Thus, the participant could not sue under section
502(a)(1)(B). However, the court allowed plaintiff's claim under 502(a)(3),
which allows a participant to sue "to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or ... to
obtain the appropriate equitable relief... to redress such violations." The
court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Mertens to "hold that an
individual may seek equitable relief from a breach of fiduciary duty under
section [502](a)(3). ' '361 The participant sought a constructive trust, which
is a form of equitable relief under 502(a)(3). 362
Some courts have allowed participants to sue for breach of fiduciary duty
based on inaccurate statements made to plan participants. In Anweiler,
363
the Seventh Circuit held that fiduciaries may not "mislead plan participants
or misrepresent the terms or administration of a plan."3 4 In Fischer v.
Philadelphia Electric Corp.,365 the Third Circuit held that a fiduciary may
not make affirmative misrepresentations about changes to an employee
benefit plan:366 "Put simply, when a plan administrator speaks, it must
speak truthfully."367
In Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund,368
the Third Circuit broadly construed the duty of a fiduciary to speak
truthfully. Mrs. Bixler, the widow of a plan participant, sued her husband's
359. 3 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1993).
360. Id. at 992.
361. Id. at 993.
362. Id.
363. 3 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1993).
364. Id. at 991. See also Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697 (1st Cir. 1994); Drennan v.
General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2416 (1993); Berlin
v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163 (6th Cir. 1988); Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees & Bartenders Union, 637 F.2d 592, 599-600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981).
365. 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 622 (1993).
366. Id. at 134-35.
367. Id. at 135.
368. 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993).
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former employer, among others, for breach of fiduciary duty.36 9 Soon
after Mr. Bixler's death, but within the election period for continuation
coverage, Mrs. Bixler called the employer to ask about death benefits.37
The general manager, Mr. Welsh, advised her that she was not entitled to
a death benefit.37" ' Although she did not ask about continuation coverage,
the court concluded that if the general manager:
knew that Mr. Bixler's death left Mrs. Bixler with substantial unpaid medical
expenses and that she could receive reimbursement for those expenses under
[the employer's] ... plan by signing and returning the COBRA [continua-
tion] notice that Welsh had sent to her husband, we believe the failure to
advise her of the available benefits might be found to be a breach of fiduciary
duty despite the fact that her inquiry was limited to the availability of a death
benefit.372
The court remanded, holding that if the employer was a fiduciary, then it
had "a duty to convey complete and accurate information that was material
to Mrs. Bixler's circumstance," even if her circumstance was broader than
her inquiry.
373
Likewise, in Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co. of America,374 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted that "[t]he duty
to disclose material information is at the core of a fiduciary's responsibili-
ty.,,37 The court held that "a fiduciary must convey complete and correct
material information to a beneficiary."376 Noting that this duty to provide
complete and correct information is not novel,377 the court cited Judge
Cardozo: "A beneficiary, about to plunge into a ruinous course of dealing,
may be betrayed by silence as well as by the spoken word. '378 The court
held that once the participant advised the insurance company of his predica-
ment, the insurer, "Colonial Life was required to do more than simply not
misinform, Colonial Life also had an affirmative obligation to inform-to
provide complete and correct material information on [the participant's]...
369. Id. at 1296.
370. Id. at 1302.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1302-03.
374. 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
375. Id. at 750.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 751.
378. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 121 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1918).
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status and options. 3 79 The trend toward requiring complete and accurate
information is growing, especially in the Third Circuit.
C. Legislative Reform
Although participants can, under limited circumstances, successfully sue
based on equitable estoppel or breach of fiduciary duty, the ultimate
protection for participants must come from legislative reform. As
mentioned previously, Senator Metzenbaum and Representative Berman
have introduced legislation that would exclude from ERISA's preemption
provision unfair claims practices by insurers. But the legislation needs to
be broadened to protect participants from fraudulent misrepresentation.
This issue needs to be clearly addressed in the legislative proposals for
national health care. It also must be included as an amendment to ERISA
to cover retirement plans and to cover medical plans that will remain
governed by ERISA after national health care legislation is adopted.
The legislation must exempt from ERISA's preemption provision unfair
claims practices regulated by state insurance law, tort claims of fraudulent
misrepresentation, and tort claims of negligence relating to the administra-
tion of an employee benefit plan. The legislation also must allow extra-
contractual and punitive damages. Without these damages, unscrupulous
employers, administrators, and insurers will not be sufficiently deterred.
Undoubtedly this will increase the costs of providing benefits. The
increased liability is, however, no different to calculate than actuarial
assumptions, such as mortality rates, or increased risks factors in insured
medical plans. It is a cost of doing business that must be factored into the
cost of the plan. Just as a plan can predict and increase funding when a
plan changes its terms (as when the plan adds coverage for a specific high-
cost therapy), the plan can predict and allocate funds for the costs of
making misrepresentations, calculation errors, and unfair claims practices'.
379. Eddy, 919 F.2d at 751.
In Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 6 F.3d 1028, 1037 n.17 (4th Cir. 1993), vacated, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 33294 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 1993), the majority implied that it might consider a federal common-
law fraud claim based on misrepresentation. The dissent expanded:
Communications that are misleading, unreliable, unrealistic, or premature, and which,
furthermore, extract reliance or a performance by employees, should, just as obviously, be
discouraged. Under ERISA the duty of administrators and employers to be forthright and
honest in whatever communications they have with present or future plan participants, at all
stages of the development of the plan, is paramount.
Id. at 1047 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
See also Long v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 994 F.2d 692, 694 (9th Cir. 1993). In Long, the Ninth
Circuit implied that a cause of action may exist for an inaccurate or incomplete summary plan. Id.
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Legislative reform would help achieve ERISA's goal of safeguarding the
rights of plan participants and providing appropriate remedies. It also
would be consistent with legislative intent as described in recent legislative
history.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even members of the Supreme Court have recognized that ERISA has
been interpreted to "deprive beneficiaries of the remedies they enjoyed
prior to the statute's history."'3 O In Mertens, a sharply divided Supreme
Court held that money damages are not available under ERISA section
502(a)(3).38' Justice White, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and Justice O'Connor, criticized the
majority's conclusion as "rest[ing] on transparently insufficient
grounds."3" 2 The dissent described the majority's interpretation of ERISA
as "perverse," '383 and stated that the majority's opinion took away
remedies that existed prior to ERISA.384
ERISA, a statute designed to protect the rights of plan participants and
beneficiaries, must not be construed to deprive participants of remedies
against unscrupulous insurers, administrators, and employers. The Supreme
Court has systematically eroded the rights of plan participants, first, by
broadly defining the boundaries of the preemption clause, and second, by
denying participants extra-contractual and punitive damages under sections
409 and 502(a)(3).
The tide must be stayed. Courts must seize the opportunity to fill in
ERISA's gaps with federal common law. Absent further congressional
enactments, federal courts are the only protectors of participants who have
been "betrayed without a remedy."
380. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2078 (White, J., dissenting) (Justice White's dissent was joined by
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor.).
381. Id. at 2068.
382. Id. at 2078.
383. Id.
384. Id.
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